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How far below the earth’s surface do property rights extend?  The con-
ventional wisdom is that a landowner holds title to everything between the 
surface and the center of the earth.  This Article is the first legal scholarship to 
challenge the traditional view.  It demonstrates that the “center of the earth” 
theory is poetic hyperbole, not binding law.  Broadly speaking, the deeper the 
disputed region, the less likely courts are to recognize the surface owner’s title.  
The emergence of new technologies for use of the deep subsurface—such as 
heat mining and carbon sequestration, both of which may help mitigate global 
climate change—requires that we develop a new model of subsurface owner-
ship.  Accordingly, this Article proposes and evaluates four alternative approaches 
to subsurface property rights.  The preferred model would recognize the surface 
owner’s title for only 1000 feet downward.  If adopted, this approach would 
eliminate over 99 percent of the supposed real property ownership in the 
United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Company A plans to install a fiber optic cable for electronic data that 
will pass one hundred feet below the land surface owned by B.  C seeks to 
create clean energy through heat mining, using naturally hot rock forma-
tions three miles below land partly owned by D corporation.  E hopes to 
mitigate global climate change by storing recaptured carbon five miles be-
neath the land surface owned by F.  Suppose that surface owners B, D, and F 
object.  These hypothetical situations all present the same question: How 
deep do property rights extend? 
For decades, the American legal system has answered this question 
with the solemn assurance that a landowner’s title extends to everything 
between the land surface and the center of the planet.  This approach is 
reflected in the Latin maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et 
ad inferos, usually translated as meaning that the rights of the surface owner 
extend upward to the heavens (ad coelum) and downward to the center of 
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the earth (ad inferos).  Thus, each landowner in the United States sup-
posedly owns a slender column of rock, soil, and other matter stretching 
downward over 3900 miles from the surface to a theoretical point in the 
middle of the earth.1 
Today, we are poised on the brink of a landmark in human explo-
ration: Scientists are now planning to drill through the earth’s crust to 
reach the next layer below, the mantle.2  When completed, this project will 
mark the first time that humans have ever penetrated below the crust.  In 
addition, scientists are now examining potential new uses for the deep 
crust, such as carbon sequestration and heat mining, both of which may 
help to alleviate global climate change.3  Accordingly, it is time to reex-
amine the “center of the earth” theory.  Just as the ad coelum doctrine 
crumbled with the invention of the airplane, the center of the earth theory 
is destined to collapse with the advent of new subsurface technology. 
This Article demonstrates that the center of the earth approach is 
mere poetic hyperbole, not law.  Indeed, the law of subsurface ownership 
is so confused that it is impossible to know how deep property rights 
extend.  Accordingly, this Article proposes a new subsurface ownership 
model that strikes an appropriate balance between the legitimate inter-
ests of the surface owner and the needs of society in general. 
Part I explores the historical evolution of the center of the earth 
theory.  It is not an ancient common law doctrine sanctified by the wis-
dom of ages.  Rather, when first announced by William Blackstone in the 
eighteenth century, it was inconsistent with prior English law.  However, 
due to Blackstone’s influence, it slowly spread to the United States during 
the nineteenth century, was repeated uncritically by American courts and 
treatise writers, and became the generally accepted view. 
Part II examines the geology of the earth’s interior in order to provide 
a scientific foundation for the balance of the Article.  Blackstone’s implicit 
belief that humans could access the deep subsurface reflects the primitive 
                                                                                                                            
 1. There is surprisingly little scholarship concerning the downward extent of a surface 
owner’s property rights as a general matter.  The subject is discussed briefly in Stuart S. Ball, 
The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 684–89 (1928), although the 
article mainly concerns rights in airspace.  Ball reaches the “working hypothesis” that “the space 
lying beneath the surface . . . can be owned,” but does not discuss the depth of ownership.  Id. at 
689; see also Haim Sandberg, Three-Dimensional Partition and Registration of Subsurface Land 
Space, 37 ISR. L. REV. 119 (2003) (discussing Israeli law concerning subsurface ownership).  For 
a discussion of the downward extent of national sovereignty, see D.S. Avery, In Anticipation of 
Subterrestrial Delimitation, 6 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 37 (1982). 
 2. Benoit Ildefonse et al., Mission Moho Workshop: Drilling Through the Oceanic Crust 
to the Mantle, 4 SCI. DRILLING 11, 11 (2007). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 321–333. 
982 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 979 (2008) 
 
 
geological knowledge of his era.  Based on twentieth century research, we 
now understand that the vast majority of the interior is inaccessible to 
humans.  For example, it would be difficult for humans to survive even 
two miles below the surface without special equipment. 
Part III analyzes appellate decisions in order to demonstrate that the 
center of the earth theory has never been binding law.  In cases involving 
underground uses within one hundred feet or so of the surface—such as dis-
putes about building foundations or tree roots—courts have routinely rec-
ognized the surface owner’s title.  Beyond this point, however, the law is 
inconsistent at best.  Broadly speaking, the deeper the disputed region, the 
less likely courts are to rely on the center of the earth theory.  Moreover, 
the deepest subsurface dispute ever litigated in the United States involved a 
region less than two miles deep—about one-twentieth of 1 percent of the 
distance from the surface to the earth’s center.4  Any suggestion that the law 
recognizes property rights below this point is no more than dicta. 
Finally, Part IV applies utilitarian criteria to craft a new model of 
subsurface ownership.  It first rejects the quaint but bizarre notion that own-
ership extends below the earth’s crust.  It then focuses on the more serious 
question of how deeply ownership should extend within the crust by evalu-
ating four alternative models.  Ultimately, it proposes that the surface own-
er’s title should extend downward for only 1000 feet, subject to special 
exceptions for mineral rights.  The subsurface beneath this point would be 
owned by the federal government.  By rejecting center of the earth rhetoric, 
this model would eliminate over 99 percent of the theoretical real property 
ownership in the United States, as measured by volume.5 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CENTER OF THE EARTH THEORY 
A. The Common Law Foundation 
The theory that American law recognizes ownership to the center of 
the earth can be traced back to 1766, when William Blackstone boldly 
proclaimed the doctrine in his famous treatise Commentaries on the Laws 
                                                                                                                            
 4. See Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986). 
 5. The earth’s continental crust is on average twenty-two to twenty-five miles thick.  
FREDERICK K. LUTGENS & EDWARD J. TARBUCK, ESSENTIALS OF GEOLOGY 19 (9th ed. 2006).  
Yet the crust accounts for only 1 percent of the earth’s volume.  NATALIE ANGIER, THE 
CANON: A WHIRLIGIG TOUR OF THE BEAUTIFUL BASICS OF SCIENCE 221 (2007).  Assuming 
that the surface owner’s rights extend downward 1000 feet, he owns less than 1 percent of the 
volume of the crust—less than 0.01 percent of the total volume of the earth. 
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of England.6  It was not a principle of Roman law7—despite the Latin 
phrasing of the maxim—nor was the theory recognized in early common 
law.8  Rather, it is best viewed as hyperbole invented by Blackstone, without 
any prior foundation in English law.  Measured against the yardstick of 
common law history, it is a comparatively modern creation. 
Blissfully ignorant of subsurface geology, English and American courts 
repeated this center of the earth dictum over the ensuing decades, often in 
cases where subsurface rights were not even in dispute.  Authors of legal 
treatises and legal dictionaries similarly adopted the dictum, using it broadly 
to help define the meaning of “land,” or to explain the scope of property 
rights that were conveyed by a deed.  By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, frequent repetition had transformed Blackstone’s naked assertion into 
a supposed rule of American law. 
1. Subsurface Ownership in Early English Common Law 
Before Blackstone’s intervention, the English approach to subsurface 
ownership was both narrow and practical.  In effect, the law recognized that 
a landowner had title only to the region immediately underneath the surface, 
which he could physically use for a productive purpose (the near-surface 
standard).  By definition, this near-surface standard meant that ownership 
extended only a short distance downward, depending on the use involved.  
For example, in a 1523 decision involving a landowner’s rights in airspace, 
one court noted that the owner “will have the land in which the tree grows, 
for the tree has its being through the earth and air, and therefore all the 
earth in which it grows in depth, and the air it needs in height belong 
to him to whom the tree belongs.”9  The implication is that the surface 
owner owned only as far downward as necessary to accommodate the roots 
of his tree. 
                                                                                                                            
 6. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *18. 
 7. The concept that the surface owner’s rights extend to the center of the earth stems 
from Cinus of Pistoia, an Italian scholar from the fourteenth century.  See JEAN BRISSAUD, 
HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 283 (Rapelje Howell trans., Little, Brown & Co. 1912). 
 8. See infra Part I.A.1.  In contrast, Scottish law apparently recognized that the surface 
owner’s title extended to the center of the earth as early as the late 1600s.  See, e.g., 1 THOMAS 
CRAIG, THE JUS FUEDALE 525 (James Avon Clyde trans., William Hodge & Co. 1934) (1655) 
(describing subsurface coal ownership as extending inter coelum et inferos); JAMES DALRYMPLE, 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 275 (1681) (noting that a conveyance of land trans-
fers title a coelo ad centrum, that is, from the heavens to the center of the earth). 
 9. Y.B. 14 Hen. 8, fol. 1, pl. 1 (1523), as translated in Edward C. Sweeney, Adjusting the 
Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. AIR L. 329, 357 (1932). 
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Another example comes from the Case of Mines10 in 1568, where the 
court had to define the scope of the Crown’s admitted right to mines of gold 
and silver, when the gold and silver were located on private lands and mixed 
with other metals.  The court concluded that “if the ore or mine in the soil 
of a subject be of copper, tin, lead, or iron, in which there is no gold or 
silver, in this case the proprietor of the soil shall have the ore or mine, and 
not the Crown.”11  This decision similarly reflects a pragmatic focus; the 
court adjudicated rights to near-surface resources that were actually subject 
to human exploitation, without discussing any deeper subsurface rights. 
Early English legal treatises reflected the same pragmatic view of 
subsurface ownership: None suggested that a landowner’s rights extended 
to the center of the earth.12  For instance, in 1628 Edward Coke grandly 
explained in The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England13 that the 
rights of the surface owner stretched “a great extent upwards . . . even up to 
heaven; for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, as is holden.”14  In 
contrast, Coke defined “land” mainly in terms of surface rights: “any ground, 
soile, or earth whatsoever; as meadowes, pastures, woods, moores, waters, 
marishes, furses, and heath.”15  Coke said little about subsurface ownership, 
aside from observing that the land owned by a property owner included items 
such as building foundations,16 minerals like “gold, silver, brasse, iron, tynne, 
                                                                                                                            
 10. R. v. Earl of Northumberland (Case of Mines), (1568) 1 Plowden 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472. 
 11. Id. at 510–11. 
 12. See, e.g., HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF, IN FOUR BOOKS 131, 132 
(W.S. Hein 1992) (1678) (loosely following Coke’s definition of “land,” but noting that the king owns 
all mines of gold and silver).  However, most sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English sources do 
not discuss subsurface ownership at all.  See, e.g., WILLIAM NOY, A TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPALL 
GROUNDS AND MAXIMES OF THE LAWES OF THE KINGDOME (London, R.H. 1641); JOHN RASTELL, 
AN EXPOSITION OF CERTAINE DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS, TERMES OF THE LAWES OF THIS 
REALME (n.p., Richard, ToHelli 1579); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, AN EPITOME OF ALL THE COMMON 
AND STATUTE LAWS OF THIS NATION (London, W. Lee 1656); EDMOND WINGATE, MAXIMES OF 
REASON: OR, THE REASON OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (London, R. & W.L. 1658). 
 13. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
(Garland Publ’g 1979) (1628). 
 14. Id. at 4.a.  Coke apparently borrowed this phrase from civil law scholars, where it can 
be traced back to Accursius, a glossator whose commentaries on Roman law were written in the 
thirteenth century.  See JOHN COBB COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 74–75 (1968).  
For a comprehensive history of the cujus est solum maxim as applied to airspace, see id. at 54–102.  
In fact, although the maxim was “not part of Roman written law . . . it is apparent that it must have 
sprung originally from principles of Roman law—though stated in a non-Roman manner.”  Id. 
at 84–85; see also Andrea B. Carroll, Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of 
Riparian Misconception, 80 TUL. L. REV. 901, 907–19 (2006) (discussing early history of the 
maxim as applied to water law). 
 15. 1 COKE, supra note 13, at 4.a. 
 16. Id. 
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leade, and other metals,”17 and salt pits.18  Two themes link these subsur-
face uses: (1) Each is located near the surface; and (2) each is a productive 
economic use.  Thus, while the surface owner’s airspace rights theoreti-
cally extended to heaven (as medieval civil law scholars suggested),19 his 
subsurface rights—still governed by the near-surface standard—were 
remarkably shallow.20 
This dichotomy between a landowner’s supposedly infinite airspace 
rights and limited subsurface rights dominated English law for over a cen-
tury after the publication of Coke’s treatise.  A handful of cases during this 
period recited the ad coelum maxim in airspace disputes, though, of course, 
always in dictum.21  And subsequent treatises routinely cited Coke for the 
proposition that airspace rights extended ad coelum.22  But when subsurface 
rights were discussed during this period—which was rare—judges and schol-
ars implicitly assumed that the rights of the surface owner extended down-
ward only within the near-surface zone where he actually used the land.23  
For instance, the 1757 decision of Goodtitle v. Alker24 examined the rights of 
a landowner whose property was burdened by a public highway.  Observing 
that the owner still “has a right to the soil,” the court discussed the uses to 
which the owner could devote the land, consistent with the highway, such as 
“mines running under it” or “by carrying water in pipes under the streets.”25 
2. Blackstone’s Absolutist Approach to Subsurface Ownership 
Blackstone initially seems to have endorsed the near-surface standard 
found in the early common law.  For example, in An Analysis of the Laws 
                                                                                                                            
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 4.b. 
 19. See COOPER, supra note 14. 
 20. A similar approach is found in WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE TOUCH-STONE OF COMMON 
ASSURANCES 90 (London, M.F. 1648).  Largely relying on Coke, Sheppard observed that “[b]y the 
grant of the land, or ground it selfe, all that is supra, as houses, trees, and the like is granted, for 
Cujus ejus est solum est usque ad coelum, also all that is infra, as Mines, earth, clay, quarres, and 
the like.”  Id.  All of Sheppard’s examples of subsurface ownership concern a productive eco-
nomic use in the near-surface zone. 
 21. See, e.g., Thrustout v. Grey, (1739) 2 Mod. 282, 87 Eng. Rep. 1242, 1244, 1245; Ryder 
v. Bentham, (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 543, 27 Eng. Rep. 1194, 1194; Pawson v. Scott, (1755) Sayer 176, 
96 Eng. Rep. 843, 843–44; Cox v. Matthews, (1684) 1 Ventris 239, 86 Eng. Rep. 160, 160. 
 22. See, e.g., JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OF WORDS (1701); THOMAS WOOD, AN 
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 116 n.b. (photo. reprint 1979) (3d ed. 1724). 
 23. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 22, at 306 (discussing rights to “dig for gravel, lime, clay” 
and to “mines of metal, coal”). 
 24. (1757) 1 Keny. 427, 96 Eng. Rep. 1044. 
 25. Id. at 1048. 
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of England,26 published in 1756, he defined “Corporeal Hereditaments” to 
“include not only the Face of the Earth, but every other Object of Sense 
adjoining thereto, and subsisting either above or beneath it.”27  Under this 
formulation, the rights of the surface owner extended only to an “object of 
sense”—such as a building foundation, a well, or a mine—that “adjoined” 
the surface. 
A decade later, however, Blackstone’s influential Commentaries on the 
Laws of England advocated the revolutionary view that ownership under 
English law extended from the surface to the center of the earth.  In defin-
ing the term “land,” Blackstone first echoed Coke, citing cujus es solum, ejus 
est usque ad coelum as “the maxim of the law” for ownership of airspace.28  
After opining that ownership extended “an indefinite extent, upwards as 
well as downwards,” Blackstone then added this phrase: 
[A]nd, downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface 
of any land and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the 
surface; as is every day’s experience in the mining countries.  So that 
the word “land” includes not only the face of the earth, but every thing 
under it, or over it.29 
Interestingly, the only citations that Blackstone offered for his definition 
were to Coke, even though this formulation contradicts Coke’s near-surface 
approach to subsurface ownership. 
The most likely source for Blackstone’s center of the earth theory is 
Samuel Pufendorf, a leading German theorist.  It is widely accepted that 
Pufendorf helped to shape the approach to property law that Blackstone 
adopted in the Commentaries.30  Consistent with views advanced by earlier 
European scholars in the civil law tradition,31 Pufendorf had previously 
embraced the center of the earth doctrine in his Elementorum Jurisprudentiae 
                                                                                                                            
 26. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, 
Clarendon 1756). 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *18. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of 
Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 968 (2006); 
Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?  Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 
399–400 (2003).  Indeed, William Blackstone sometimes cited to Samuel Pufendorf to support 
his interpretation of English property law.  See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *8. 
 31. The center of the earth theory originated in civil law scholarship from the fourteenth 
century.  See BRISSAUD, supra note 7, at 283; LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
474 (John Lisle trans., Macmillan Co. 1912) (1873).  Luigi Miraglia commented that the doctrine 
was “a hyperbole . . . [which has] no foundation in the sources of Roman law.”  Id. at 475. 
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Universalis Libri Duo, published in 1661.32  In explaining the meaning of 
a “corporeal thing,” Pufendorf observed: 
Proper space is that which perpendicularly overhangs or lies beneath 
the area of the possessor, upwards as well as downwards.  Now 
since the areas of the terrestrial globe possess a spherical convex-
ity, any one understands that perpendicular lines meet below in 
the centre of the earth . . . . [Accordingly,] I might lawfully dig 
down until I reached only as far as the centre of the earth, even if 
it were possible to go farther.33 
Here we see the core of Blackstone’s later position: The boundary of 
subsurface property is defined by lines that connect the surface parcel to 
the center of the earth. 
Blackstone’s acceptance of this sweeping view of subsurface property 
rights is consistent with his natural law approach to property.34  For 
Blackstone, property was a gift from God, not the product of human deci-
sion.  Citing Genesis, he explained that “the all-bountiful creator” gave 
humans ‘“dominion over all the earth.’”35  Accordingly, “[t]he earth there-
fore, and all things therein, are the general property of all mankind . . . from 
the immediate gift of the creator.”36  From that starting point, “the princi-
ples of universal law” vested title in the first person to occupy a parcel of 
land.37  Just as the God-given scope of  human dominion extended to 
“all the earth,” the dominion of the surface owner must logically include 
all of the subsurface—down to the center of the earth. 
Yet Blackstone’s religiously inspired standard was internally incon-
sistent.  He partially justified38 the center of the earth theory by stating that it 
                                                                                                                            
 32. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI DUO 
52 (William Abbott Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1931) (1661).  In the original Latin passage, 
Pufendorf discussed ownership downward in centro terrae and ad centrum terrae.  This usage may 
well be the source of the early Scottish theory, as expressed by James Dalrymple in 1681, that owner-
ship extends downward ad centrum.  See DALRYMPLE, supra note 8, at 385. 
 33. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 32, at 52. 
 34. For discussion of Blackstone’s approach to property in general, see Albert W. Alschuler, 
Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996), and Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the 
“Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67 (1985). 
 35. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *2 (quoting Genesis 1:28). 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. at *9. 
 38. Consistent with natural law theory, Blackstone was largely content to proclaim his new 
theory of subsurface ownership without demonstrating that it was supported by logic or policy.  See id. 
at *2.  Indeed, earlier in the Commentaries, he noted that “we rest satisfied with the decision of the 
laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been 
built.”  Id. 
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reflected “every day’s experience in the mining countries.”39  But this was 
obviously untrue; early mines rarely reached a depth of 1000 feet, much less 
the center of the earth, so this rule was not consistent with “experience.”  
In fact, as the Case of Mines had indicated two centuries earlier, English law 
had long held that the surface owner owned the mines underneath his land.40  
Thus, “every day’s practical experience” in mining regions would have 
endorsed the traditional near-surface approach to subsurface ownership, not 
Blackstone’s new absolutism. 
In the ensuing decades, Blackstone’s center of the earth theory appeared 
in only a handful of English cases41 and treatises.42  But it came to be 
expressed in two different formulations.  Some authorities simply quoted 
the English text from the Commentaries,43 as noted above.  Others expressed 
the concept in Latin, most commonly by amending Coke’s ad coelum 
maxim to add et ad inferos (meaning “to the center of the earth”)44 at 
the end, providing a pleasing symmetry that the original lacked.45  This 
ad inferos phrasing had long been used in civil law scholarship.46  Thus, 
                                                                                                                            
 39. Id. at *18. 
 40. See R. v. Earl of Northumberland (Case of Mines), (1568) 1 Plowden 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 
472, 510–11; see also supra text accompanying notes 10–11.  However, there were exceptions to 
this rule.  For example, miners in Cornwall were allowed to develop tin mines on certain lands 
without the owners’ consent.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Brenton, (1847) 10 Q.B. 26, 116 Eng. Rep. 10, 
10 (discussing the history of this custom).  Similarly, as Jeremy Bentham observed, under some 
circumstances if a vein of ore was found on one parcel, the owner was entitled to mine all of the 
vein even if it extended into land owned by another.  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF 
LEGISLATION 164 (1931) (1802). 
 41. See, e.g., Doe v. Burt, (1787) 1 T.R. 701, 99 Eng. Rep. 1330, 1330 (noting the argument 
of counsel that the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum et ad inferos supported the 
defendant’s claim of title to the cellar).  Interestingly, the theory does not appear in the leading 
legal dictionaries of the era.  See 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 
(n.p., 1789) (defining “land” by citing to Coke, with no mention of subsurface ownership); GILES 
JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (n.p., 1750) (same). 
 42. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING 
REAL PROPERTY 3 (London, A. Strahan 1804) (explaining that ownership extends downward in a 
“direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth”). 
 43. See, e.g., id. 
 44. In Latin, infernus literally refers to the “lower world” or the place of the dead—what 
modern theologians would call “hell.”  CASSELL’S LATIN DICTIONARY 303–04 (D.P. Simpson 
ed., 5th ed. 1977).  However, legal scholars have routinely translated et ad inferos to mean the 
center of the earth. 
 45. See, e.g., Doe, 99 Eng. Rep. 1330.  Over time, several variants of this phrase emerged, all 
connoting ownership to the center of the earth.  See, e.g., Parrot Silver & Copper Co. v. Heinze, 64 
P. 326, 329 (Mont. 1901) (usque ad coelum et ad orcum). 
 46. For example, a 1655 treatise on Scottish law based on civil law sources described a 
landowner’s rights to subsurface coal with the phrase omnia que inter coelum et inferos, trans-
lated as “everything under the surface—from the sky to the centre of the earth.”  1 CRAIG, supra 
note 8, at 525. 
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cujus est solum, ejus est ad coelum became cujus est solum, ejus est ad 
coelum et ad inferos (the ad inferos maxim). 
3. American Adoption of the Center of the Earth Theory 
Blackstone’s Commentaries had a profound impact on the new United 
States.  Prized for their clear structure, comprehensive scope, and engaging 
prose, the Commentaries served as the foundation for the emerging American 
legal system.47  As Daniel Boorstin famously noted, “no other book—except 
the Bible—has played so great a role” in shaping American institutions.48  
Indeed, Stephen Feldman explained that “[t]he American faith in natural 
law was, to a great extent, inherited from William Blackstone.”49  Propelled 
by Blackstone’s endorsement, the center of the earth theory slowly spread 
to the United States. 
The theory first appeared in American law in the 1797 decision of 
State v. David.50  David was indicted in Delaware for stealing two barrels 
of herrings, after the barrels were found buried on his land.  The prosecution 
argued that the barrels were “in defendant’s possession, because everything 
above and below the soil belongs to the possessor of the soil,”51 and David 
was found guilty.  His defense counsel James Wilson, who included the 
decision in his widely circulated collection of early American cases, added 
a notation in the book that “[t]he rule, usque ad caelum et infernos, only relates 
to appurtenances,” and therefore should not have been used by the court.52 
In David, the barrels were located only a few feet below the land sur-
face, so the issue was whether the surface owner held title to the subsurface 
zone within five feet of the surface—not who owned the subsurface ten miles 
or one hundred miles below.  The use of the center of the earth theory in 
this context was overkill; to paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s remark in a 
different context, it was using “a missile to kill a mouse.”53  In fact, the David 
court would have reached the same result by applying the pre-Blackstone 
                                                                                                                            
 47. See generally Alschuler, supra note 34, at 4–19 (discussing the impact of Blackstone on 
American law). 
 48. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW, at iii (Beacon Press 
1958) (1941). 
 49. Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of 
Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1395 (1997). 
 50. 1 Del. Cas. 160 (1797). 
 51. Id. at 160. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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approach to subsurface ownership: The surface owner owns those portions 
of the near-surface zone that he actually uses. 
David foreshadowed the hyperbolic manner in which later American 
decisions and treatises utilized Blackstone’s invention.  Nineteenth-century 
courts often quoted the center of the earth language to justify protecting 
the surface owner, but almost all of these cases involved situations in 
which the disputed region was relatively shallow, usually less than one 
hundred feet deep.54  Similarly, leading American authors such as James 
Kent adopted the center of the earth standard without providing any 
analysis or justification other than a citation to Blackstone’s text.55  For 
Kent and other American legal scholars of his era, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were literally gospel—to be followed without question.  
Indeed, Kent’s experience of reading Blackstone at age fifteen had inspired 
him to become a lawyer.56 
By the end of the nineteenth century, judges and scholars had repeated 
Blackstone’s assertion so frequently that it was assumed to be a rule of 
American law.57  Representative of the era, one treatise explained that “the 
correct legal idea of land, or of real property, is of a portion of the earth 
whose boundaries, beginning at a point in the center of the earth, extend 
straight upwards to the earth’s surface, and indefinitely upward beyond.”58  
Many courts wrongly assumed that this was an ancient principle, from 
the “early days of the common law,”59 or “as old, probably, as ownership 
in land.”60 
                                                                                                                            
 54. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Bachrach, 48 N.E. 327 (Ill. 1897) (building foundation); Cockrill 
v. Downey, 4 Kan. 426 (1868) (tree roots); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855) (groundwater); 
Goodall v. City of Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32 (1856) (road easement). 
 55. See, e.g., JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES 1 (Boston, 
Charles C. Little & James Brown 3d ed. 1840); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 321 (N.Y., O. Halsted 1826–30).  In the second half of the nineteenth century, legal 
dictionaries also began to endorse this view.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (1891) 
(listing the ad inferos maxim, defined as meaning: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also 
to the sky and to the depths.  The owner of a piece of ground owns everything above and 
below it to an indefinite extent.”). 
 56. Alschuler, supra note 34, at 6. 
 57. See, e.g., Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. Hendry, 50 P. 330, 332 (N.M. 1897) 
(“rule”); Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Hughes, 38 A. 568, 569 (Pa. 1897) (“general rule”). 
 58. JOHN G. HAWLEY & MALCOLM MCGREGOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 5 (4th ed. 1910); see also EARL P. HOPKINS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 3–4 (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1896); 1 ALFRED G. REEVES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF REAL PROPERTY 73 (1909). 
 59. Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 P. 468, 470 (Okla. 1917). 
 60. Becket v. Clark, 40 Conn. 485, 488 (1873); see also Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 
93, 95 (Iowa 1902) (“[The ad inferos maxim] is one of the oldest rules of property known 
to the law . . . .”). 
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B. The Center of the Earth Theory Today 
Most modern legal texts continue to endorse the center of the earth 
theory.61  For example, one well-known treatise echoes the “traditional 
view” that the owner’s “right to exclusive possession extends downward 
‘to the center of the earth’” such that “ownership is viewed as extending 
downward indefinitely.”62  Another states that “[t]he title of the owner of 
land presumptively extends upward indefinitely and downward to the 
earth’s center, embracing everything upon the surface and everything 
beneath it.”63  A third source explains that a tract of land 
is an inverted pyramid having its tip, or apex, at the center of the earth, 
extending outward through the surface of the earth at the boundary 
lines of the tract, and continuing on upward to the heavens.64 
A few treatises adopt a more cautious approach to the issue: They 
acknowledge that the surface owner’s rights reach below the surface, but 
they ignore the difficult issue of how far downward those rights extend.  
Thus, one text merely provides that “[t]he possessory interest in property 
also extends below the surface of the land.”65  Another notes that “[t]he law 
recognizes . . . the right of the surface owner to the exclusive possession of 
the earth, minerals, and other substances below the surface of the land.”66 
                                                                                                                            
 61. See, e.g., 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 12 (1997) (citing the Latin maxim for the 
proposition that “the title to land extends downward from the surface to the center of the earth”); 
VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.3 (A. James Casner ed., 1954) (noting that the “surface 
possessor’s right to exclusive possession extends downward usque ad inferos,” except where mineral 
rights have been severed or mineral claimants have extralateral rights); 73 C.J.S. Property § 23 
(2004) (“Land includes not only the face of the earth but everything under it or over it, and has in 
its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward.”). 
 62. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 25–26, 412 
(3d ed. 2000) (stating the “traditional view” but noting an exception where the mineral rights have 
been severed from the surface).  Indeed, my own treatise is similarly overbroad.  After characterizing 
the center of the earth standard as a common law “theory,” it nonetheless states that “[c]ontemporary 
courts still protect the surface owner’s absolute right to possession when third parties intrude into the 
subsurface, whether by mining, installing a pipeline, or otherwise.”  JOHN G. SPRANKLING, 
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 520 (2d ed. 2007).  This assessment is correct only within the 
near-surface zone. 
 63. 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 14.04(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2000) 
(stating the doctrine but noting that it is subject to “many qualifications when actually applied”). 
 64. ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 4 (9th ed. 1988). 
 65. 9 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64A.01[6] (Michael Allan 
Wolf ed., 2007). 
 66. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GREY ON TORTS § 1.5 (3d ed. 2006). 
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In practice, almost all modern cases continue to embrace the center 
of the earth fiction.67  Some decisions recite the complete ad inferos maxim68 
in Latin—including an English translation69—while others merely pro-
claim that the surface owner owns to the “center of the earth”70 or “to the 
depths.”71  Thus, for example, in 2007 the Illinois Supreme Court repeated 
the rule that ‘“[t]he owner in fee owns to the center of the earth.’”72  In the 
same year, the Iowa Supreme Court justified a ruling, in part, by explaining 
that the result “conforms to the familiar legal maxim cujus est solum, ejus est 
usque ad coelum et ad inferos—‘[w]hoever owns the soil owns everything up 
to the sky and down to the depths.’”73 
II. A GEOLOGY LESSON 
Blackstone’s center of the earth theory implicitly assumed that humans 
could productively use the deep subsurface.  Indeed, as noted above,74 
Pufendorf actually discussed digging a hole from the surface to the center of 
                                                                                                                            
 67. A few modern decisions have expressly challenged the ad inferos approach.  See, e.g., 
Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996); FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. 
Conservation Comm’n, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183 (Tex. App. Feb. 6, 2003). 
 68. Some courts use variants of the maxim.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe Hous. Auth., 
896 P.2d 503, 515 n.83 (Okla. 1994) (using the variant a centro usque ad coelum, translated as 
“land is deemed to extend from the center of the earth to the sky”); Brooks v. City of Memphis, 241 
S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tenn. 1951) (using variant ab infernis ad coelum, translated as “owning it from 
hell to heaven”). 
 69. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 
693, 696 n.1 (Colo. 2002) (noting that the surface owner owns “to the depths” and citing to the 
maxim); Stanley v. Renshaw, No. CV960054578S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2001, at *4 (Conn. 
Sup. Ct. June 14, 2002) (same); Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa 
2004) (noting that the surface owner owns “down to the depths” and citing the maxim); Energy 
Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143 n.14 (W. Va. 2003) (citing the maxim for the rule that the 
surface owner “own[s] from the heavens to the center of the earth”). 
 70. See, e.g., Martin v. Sarah Rhodes, LLC, 548 S.E.2d 365, 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
an earlier case for the rule that the land boundary goes down “to the center of the earth”); Lupo v. 
Bd. of Assessors, 799 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (citing Blackstone for the center of the 
earth standard); Foxtail Props., LLC v. Goodrich,  No. 20031050-CA, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 335, 
at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004) (citing a treatise for the rule that the title of the surface owner 
“presumptively extends . . . downward to the earth’s center”). 
 71. See, e.g., Smith v. Mun. Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 300, 303 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998) (‘“The 
owner of submerged land, like the owner of dry land, owns also to the sky and to the depths . . . .’” 
(quoting Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 294 S.E.2d 23, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982))). 
 72. Kankakee County Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 871 N.E.2d 38, 52 (Ill. 2007) 
(quoting Jilek v. Chi., Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 47 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1943)). 
 73. Orr v. Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Nichols, 687 N.W.2d 
at 566). 
 74. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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the earth.75  However, before the early 1900s, almost nothing was known 
about the earth’s internal structure.76  In Blackstone’s era, some scientists 
apparently believed that the earth was a rocky sphere—potentially suitable 
for human use at deep levels.77  In fact, the earth’s interior is both complex 
and inhospitable to humans. 
Today we understand that the earth consists of a thin, rigid shell 
essentially “floating” over a huge, rather flexible interior, somewhat like an 
egg.78  This rocky shell occupies about 5 percent of the earth’s volume, while 
its contents account for the remaining 95 percent.79  As one commentator 
summarized, our planet is “an orb composed of a ridiculously dense metal 
pit surrounded by comparatively lighter, fluffier layers and topped off with a 
crispy outer crust.”80  Based on seismic data from earthquake waves,81 
twentieth century scientists concluded that the earth had four basic 
internal layers, each with a different chemical composition: crust, mantle, 
outer core, and inner core.82  These layers are separately discussed below. 
Two key subsurface characteristics—pressure and temperature—gen-
erally increase with depth,83 creating conditions in which humans cannot 
survive.84  For example, while the topsoil on the outer crust might reach 
                                                                                                                            
 75. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 32, at 52. 
 76. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 329–30. 
 77. Most authors addressing the issue between 1600 and 1800 viewed the earth as a “solid 
globe” containing “empty spaces” variously called “caverns, cavities, abysses, voids, pits, crypts, 
bubbles, etc.”  2 FRANCOIS ELLENBERGER, HISTORY OF GEOLOGY: THE GREAT AWAKENING AND 
ITS FIRST FRUITS—1660–1810, at 18–20 (Marguerite Carozzi ed., 1999). 
 78. See 1 EARTH SCIENCE: THE PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OF THE EARTH 26 (James A. 
Woodhead ed., 2001) [hereinafter EARTH SCIENCE] (comparing the rigid shell components to 
“blocks of ice floating in a lake”). 
 79. This rocky shell—called the lithosphere—consists of the crust and the upper mantle 
and averages 100 kilometers in depth.  See LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 20.  The cen-
ter of the earth is about 6400 kilometers below the surface.  W. KENNETH HAMBLIN & ERIC 
H. CHRISTIANSEN, EARTH’S DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 12 (8th ed. 1998).  Using the standard formula for 
determining the volume of a sphere, the earth contains 1,099,571,746,133 cubic kilometers (cu km).  
A sphere with a radius of 6300 kilometers (that is, without the 100 kilometers lithosphere) has 
a volume of 1,048,830,476,400 cu km.  Thus, the approximate volume of the lithosphere is the differ-
ence between these two figures: 50,741,269,733 cu km.  This is 4.6 percent of the earth’s total volume. 
 80. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 218. 
 81. See LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 329–30. 
 82. See EARTH SCIENCE, supra note 78, at 37–39.  The more recent trend is to view the earth 
as consisting of five layers defined by physical properties, not chemical composition: lithosphere, 
asthenosphere, mesosphere, outer core, and inner core.  See, e.g., LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 
5, at 19–21.  However, for simplicity this Article will use the traditional classification. 
 83. See LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 19. 
 84. As one author observed, below about fourteen kilometers (8.7 miles) deep, “any-
thing—drill or human—would be crushed by Earth’s pressure of 50,000 pounds per square inch 
(4,000 times that of the atmosphere) and vaporized by a temperature of 1,000 [degrees] F.”  Brad 
Lemley, The Core: What Is Smack in the Center of Earth?, SCI. WORLD, Dec. 13, 2002, at 14, 14. 
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30°C on a warm afternoon, the temperature at the earth’s center may 
exceed 6700°C.85  In a similar manner, while the air pressure at the earth’s 
surface is a comfortable 14.7 pounds per square inch (psi), the pressure at 
the center is about 50 million psi.86  Productive human activity is possi-
ble only within the shallowest portion of the earth’s crust. 
A third important characteristic of the earth’s interior is movement.  
While one might imagine that the subsurface is fixed in place, like the 
inside of a large boulder, in reality portions of the interior are engaged in 
different forms of motion.  The discussion below identifies five distinct 
types of subsurface motion, which make it impossible to delineate subsur-
face property rights within fixed boundaries. 
A. The Crust 
The earth’s crust averages twenty-two to twenty-five miles in thick-
ness under the continents, and about four miles under the oceans.87  Humans 
have never penetrated below the crust.  In fact, virtually all subsurface activi-
ties by humans—such as building foundations, mines, and water wells—occur 
in the very shallow crust within 1000 feet of the surface.  The only current 
economic uses below this point in the United States are oil and gas wells, 
special wells used for the disposal of chemical wastes, and certain mines; but 
none of these uses exceeds six miles in depth.88  While it does contain coal, 
gold, oil, and many other valuable minerals, almost 60 percent of the 
continental crust is a compound of silicon and oxygen.89 
Even in the shallow crust, the temperature is quite high.  For instance, 
at a depth of only two miles, temperatures range from 50°C to 150°C;90 in 
other words, much of the crust at this level is hotter than boiling water.  
Yet a human is in imminent danger of fatal heatstroke when his body 
                                                                                                                            
 85. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 19. 
 86. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 219. 
 87. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 19. 
 88. For example, the deepest oil well in Oklahoma—a major oil-producing state—is only 
about five miles deep.  See MARK C. SNEAD, OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, THE ECONOMICS 
OF DEEP DRILLING IN OKLAHOMA 7 fig. 5 (2005), http://economy.okstate.edu/papers/ 
economics%20of%20deep%20drilling.pdf.  In fact, the average depth of oil and gas wells in the 
United States is about one mile.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE DEPTH OF CRUDE OIL AND 
NATURAL GAS WELLS, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_welldep_s1_a.htm (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2008). 
 89. FRANK PRESS & RAYMOND SIEVER, EARTH 388 (4th ed. 1986). 
 90. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY: IMPACT OF ENHANCED 
GEOTHERMAL SYSTEMS (EGS) ON THE UNITED STATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2–15 (2006) 
[hereinafter MIT STUDY]. 
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temperature reaches only 40°C.91  The estimated temperature at the bottom 
of the crust ranges from 400° to 800°C,92 higher than the average surface 
temperature on Venus.93  To put this level of heat in context, it is greater 
than the melting point of either lead or tin.94  The pressure level at the 
crust-mantle boundary is approximately 165,000 psi, more than four times 
the level of pressure that steel can withstand.95  In short, humans cannot 
survive more than a few seconds under such conditions. 
The dominant form of crust movement is continental drift, which is 
produced by plate tectonics.  The crust and portions of the upper mantle are 
divided into seven to ten large “plates” about fifty miles thick, which float on 
top of a layer of molten or nearly molten rock.96  Propelled by convective 
flow from the lower mantle, these plates move about four inches per year.97  
Almost all of the United States is located on the North American plate, 
which is moving slowly westward in relation to the lower mantle.98 
B. The Mantle 
The mantle was discovered in 1906, when a seismologist noticed that 
certain earthquake waves moving downward in the crust were soon reflected 
upward by a layer of denser material.99  In fact, there is a “marked change in 
                                                                                                                            
 91. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO HOT ENVIRONMENTS, REVISED CRITERIA 85 
(1986) [hereinafter NIOSH CRITERIA]. 
 92. PRESS & SIEVER, supra note 89, at 374. 
 93. The surface temperature of Venus—the hottest planet in our solar system—is about 
475°C.  12 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 311 (15th ed. 1992). 
 94. 15 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 93, at 962. 
 95. The pressure at a depth of forty kilometers (24.9 miles) is 11.2 kilobars.  JEAN-PAUL 
POIRIER, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHYSICS OF THE EARTH’S INTERIOR 236 (1991).  11.2 kilobars, 
converted to pounds per square inch (psi), the most common measurement of pressure used in the 
United States, is over 165,000 psi.  The tensile strength of steel is about 40,000 psi.  Commerce 
Resources Corp. Announces 17 Drill Holes on Upper Fir Extend Strike to Over 1 Kilometer, 
CANADA NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://www.commerceresources.com/s/ 
News-Releases.asp?ReportID=263900.  Put another way, the pressure at the crust-mantle boundary 
is roughly equal to the force produced by trying to hold two jumbo jets in the palm of one’s hand.  
A Boeing 747 weighs about 870,000 pounds.  Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Let There Be Flight: It’s 
Time to Reform the Regulation of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 101, 106 n.16 
(2004).  Assuming that a human palm is twelve square inches in size, then the force exerted by 
1.74 million pounds (two jets) distributed over twelve inches is 145,000 psi, slightly less than the 
165,000 psi pressure at the boundary. 
 96. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 223.  There are also various minor plates.  Id.; see also 
HAMBLIN & CHRISTIANSEN, supra note 79, at 13. 
 97. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 223. 
 98. See LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 360. 
 99. EARTH SCIENCE, supra note 78, at 32. 
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chemical composition” at the border between the crust and the mantle—a 
higher concentration of oxygen and silicon—which produces this 
increased density.100 
Occupying over 80 percent of the earth’s total volume, the mantle 
extends downward beneath the crust to 1800 miles.101  Despite several mod-
ern efforts, humans have not yet penetrated past the crust-mantle border.102  
This “elusive frontier has been a symbolic goal for many geologists, but 
beyond the reach of available drilling technology.”103  However, a specially 
designed drilling vessel operated by the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, 
an international research effort, is capable of drilling through the oceanic 
crust into the mantle, and planning for this project is now underway.104 
The pressure and the temperature of the mantle create conditions that 
effectively prohibit any meaningful human use of this region, given present 
technology.  Even the pending attempt to drill into the mantle as a scien-
tific experiment faces challenges; the organizers candidly admit that “[t]he 
temperature and cost limits beyond which we are unlikely to successfully 
drill are currently unknown.”105  One major question is the effect of “ther-
mal stress on hole stability,” that is, the risk that the hot mantle rock will 
“flow” so as to close the hole when the drill bit is removed.106  Subsurface 
temperatures steadily increase from perhaps 600°C at the crust-mantle bor-
der to between 3500° to 5000°C at the mantle-core border.107  Thus, for 
example, the temperature in the middle of the mantle is high enough to 
melt iron.108  Similarly, the pressure accelerates from 165,000 psi near the 
crust to almost 21 million psi next to the core.109 
The components of the mantle move both horizontally and vertically.  
While part of the mantle consists of molten rock,110 most of it has the 
                                                                                                                            
 100. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 19. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The world’s deepest borehole is located on the Kola Peninsula in Russia, which extends 
down 40,200 feet, or about 7.6 miles.  See Kurt Bram et al., The KTB Borehole: Germany’s Superdeep 
Telescope Into the Earth’s Crust, 7 OILFIELD REV. 4, 7 (1995), http://www.slb.com/media/services/ 
resources/oilfieldreview/ors95/jan95/01950422.pdf. 
 103. Ildefonse et al., supra note 2, at 11. 
 104. Id. at 16. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. R.T. Merrill & P.L. McFadden, Paleomagnetism and the Nature of the Geodynamo, 
248 SCI. 345, 346 (1990) (“Most investigators would place the temperature of the core-mantle 
boundary between 3500 [degrees] and 5000 [degrees] C.”). 
 108. Iron melts at 1536°C.  15 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 93, at 991. 
 109. The pressure at 2971 kilometers (1846.1 miles) is 1442 kilobars.  POIRIER, supra note 95, 
at 237.  This is the equivalent of 20,914,442 psi. 
 110. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 20. 
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consistency of Silly Putty.111  Thus, it tends to flow around the earth’s core, 
at a rate of up to four inches each year.112  In addition, as noted above, 
portions of the upper mantle move separately from the lower mantle due 
to continental drift.  Finally, convective forces within the mantle cause 
vertical movement: “[W]arm buoyant rock rises and cooler, dense material 
sinks—[which] is the underlying driving force for plate movement.”113  Of 
course, this “warm” rock is largely molten lava—the raw material for 
volcanic eruptions on the earth’s surface. 
C. The Outer Core 
The earth’s outer core was also discovered in 1906.114  It consists of a 
layer of molten metal—apparently an iron-nickel alloy115—that is about 
1410 miles thick, extending downward to about 3170 miles.116  Predictably, 
both the temperature and the pressure are extremely high.  At the boundary 
with the inner core, the temperature is thought to be approximately 
5000°C,117 hotter than the outer layer of the sun.118  In the same location, 
the estimated pressure is over 47 million psi.119 
The viscosity of the liquid metal in the outer core is akin to water.120  
Traveling around the inner core at a velocity of about six miles per year, 
this molten material produces the earth’s magnetic field.121  Life on earth 
                                                                                                                            
 111. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 220 (“Like Silly Putty, the mantle is solid but springy, almost 
squishy, and it can move and it does all the time.”). 
 112. Id.; see also LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that the rocks in the lower 
mantle are “still very hot and capable of very gradual flow”). 
 113. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 359. 
 114. C.M.R. FOWLER, THE SOLID EARTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL GEOPHYSICS 2 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 115. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 329 (referring to liquid “iron-nickel alloy”). 
 116. EARTH SCIENCE, supra note 78, at 38 (discussing the depth of the outer core). 
 117. Bruce A. Buffett, The Thermal State of the Earth’s Core, 299 SCI. 1675, 1675 (2003) 
(summarizing estimates from 5000° to 6000°K; the Kelvin scale modifies the Centigrade scale by 
beginning at absolute zero, which is –273.18°C). 
 118. The outer boundary of the sun has a temperature of about 4200°K.  27 THE NEW 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 93, at 510. 
 119. The pressure at this depth is thought to be 3245 kilobars.  POIRIER, supra note 95, at 
237.  This translates to 47,064,746 psi. 
 120. Bruce A. Buffett, Dynamics of the Earth’s Core, in EARTH’S DEEP INTERIOR: MINERAL 
PHYSICS AND TOMOGRAPHY FROM THE ATOMIC TO THE GLOBAL SCALE 37 (Shun-ichiro Karato 
et al. eds., 2000). 
 121. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 219 (discussing the formation of the magnetic field); Buffett, 
supra note 120, at 37 (discussing the viscosity and the velocity of the liquid metal, which trav-
els 10,000 meters or 6.2 miles each year). 
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depends on this field, which helps shelter the surface from dangerous solar 
radiation such as gamma rays and X-rays.122 
D. The Inner Core 
As one author observed, “[t]he dream of exploring our planet’s center is 
probably as old as our understanding that the earth is round . . . and therefore 
has a center.”123  But despite occasional proposals, humans have never made a 
serious effort to reach the center, which is located in the inner core.124  
Interestingly, it is difficult to even determine the true center of the earth: 
“The problem is very much akin to measuring the center of mass of a glob 
of Jell-O, because Earth is constantly changing shape due to tectonic and 
climatic forces.”125 
Discovered in 1936,126 the inner core is a relatively solid iron-nickel 
sphere127 that occupies less than 1 percent of earth’s volume.128  It extends 
downward for about 750 miles to the true center of the earth, 3900 miles 
below the surface.129  Predictably, the temperature and pressure are intense.  
The temperature at the center of the earth may exceed 6700°C,130 while 
the pressure is greater than 50 million psi.131 
Although scientists debate the consistency of the inner core, some 
believe that it is akin to “very stiff Silly Putty.”132  Thus, the extent of 
movement within the inner core, if any, is unknown.  But it is widely 
agreed that the inner core is rotating more quickly than the rest of the earth, 
moving eastward at over sixty miles per year in relation to the surface.133 
                                                                                                                            
 122. See ANGIER, supra note 5, at 219. 
 123. William Speed Weed, The 3rd Annual Year in Ideas: The Jules Verne Project, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Dec. 14, 2003, at 79. 
 124. For example, David Stevenson has suggested using a nuclear explosion to launch a mass 
containing liquid iron and small probes toward the core.  David J. Stevenson, Mission to Earth’s 
Core: A Modest Proposal, 423 NATURE 239, 239 (2003). 
 125. NASA Scientist Finds a New Way to the Center of the Earth, SCIENCEDAILY, June 
12, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/070612084458.htm. 
 126. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 330. 
 127. Id. at 19; see also ANGIER, supra note 5, at 219. 
 128. J.A. JACOBS, DEEP INTERIOR OF THE EARTH 1 (1992). 
 129. LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5, at 329. 
 130. Id. at 19. 
 131. ANGIER, supra note 5, at 219. 
 132. Stephen Battersby, Watch That Wobble, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 18, 2006, at 42, 44. 
 133. Phil Berardelli, Geologists Now Know What Makes the World Go ’Round, INSIGHT 
ON NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996, at 38, 38. 
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III. DEMISE OF THE CENTER OF THE EARTH THEORY 
A. The Theory as Hyperbole: Below Two Miles 
1. The Limits of Dicta 
It is axiomatic that dicta are not binding in our common law system.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, dicta “may be followed if suf-
ficiently persuasive but . . . are not controlling.”134  Although the line 
between dicta and holding is sometimes difficult to discern, the traditional 
rule is that dicta refers to one or more statements in a judicial opinion that 
are logically unnecessary to the resolution of the case.135  The reason for the 
dicta-holding dichotomy is straightforward: “Dicta are less carefully 
considered than holdings, and, therefore, less likely to be accurate state-
ments of law.”136 
No appellate decision has ever considered whether private property 
rights extend to the mantle, the outer core, or the inner core.  Thus, all past 
judicial statements about ownership to the “center of the earth”137 must be 
considered dicta as to these regions, simply because such statements were not 
necessary to resolving the actual cases presented, all of which involved the 
crust—and, indeed, only the very shallow crust.138  The physical conditions 
                                                                                                                            
 134. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935).  See generally Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, 
Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994). 
 135. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 134, at 1056 (noting that the “most influential 
definition” of dictum is found in Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines it as a ‘“judicial comment 
made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and 
therefore not precedential’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004))). 
 136. Dorf, supra note 134, at 2000.  Michael Dorf also identifies a second, but less vital, 
rationale: legitimacy.  Id. at 2000–01 (“According to this view, dicta have no precedential effect 
because courts have legitimate authority only to decide cases, not to make law in the abstract.”). 
 137. See, e.g., decisions cited supra notes 67–73. 
 138. The expression of the center of the earth theory in the form of a maxim makes no 
difference to this analysis, as the air rights decisions demonstrate.  While maxims represented 
important “nuggets of legal wisdom” in the early common law period, their influence declined 
with the evolution of legal positivism, which emphasizes “facts rather than concepts.”  J. Stanley 
McQuade, Ancient Legal Maxims and Modern Human Rights, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75, 76–78 
(1996).  The “disappearance of maxim jurisprudence” has been attributed to the influence of John 
Austin and Jeremy Bentham.  Id. at 78.  As Roscoe Pound observed, a nineteenth-century “attempt 
to revive a jurisprudence of maxims came to nothing.”  Roscoe Pound, The Maxims of Equity—I, 34 
HARV. L. REV. 809, 836 (1921).  Modern authorities tend to view maxims with suspicion, as 
dangerous overstatements.  Even Blackstone conceded that a maxim could not be viewed as a “rule 
of the common law” unless it could be shown that “it hath been always the custom to observe it.”  1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *67–68.  As discussed below, see infra pp. 1003–04, American courts 
have typically ignored the center of earth theory, even in disputes within a mile or two of the surface. 
1000 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 979 (2008) 
 
 
deep within the earth—including movement, pressure, resources, and tempera-
ture—are fundamentally different from those within the crust that courts may 
have considered in past decisions.  In fact, as discussed above,139 the center of 
the earth approach evolved in the late eighteenth century, long before 
twentieth-century scientists discovered the complexity of the earth’s interior. 
The evolution of property rights in airspace provides a helpful model 
for assessing the scope of ownership rights within the crust.  As discussed 
above,140 the surface owner’s rights in airspace and the subsurface were seen 
as parallel: According to Blackstone’s formulation, an owner’s title extended 
up to the heavens and down to the center of the earth.  Indeed, both sets of 
rights were linked together in the “popular ear-catching Latin maxim,”141 
cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. 
American courts repeatedly advanced this expansive view of airspace 
rights—until the invention of the airplane sparked litigation, especially in the 
1930s.  In this new environment, the Georgia Supreme Court explained that 
the “maxim . . . is a generalization from old cases involving title to [air]space 
within the range of actual occupation, and any statement as to title beyond 
was manifestly a mere dictum.”142  Striking a similar chord, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the ad coelum approach to airspace: “We think it is not the law, and 
that it never was the law.”143  It proceeded to explain that the maxim “simply 
meant that the owner of the land could use the overlying space to such an 
extent as he was able,”144 not that his title literally extended to the heavens. 
Based on similar arguments, courts across the nation rapidly jettisoned 
the ad coelum approach to airspace rights, most commonly by finding that 
the surface owner’s rights extended upward only far enough to accommodate 
normal surface uses.145  The completion of this process is symbolized by the 
                                                                                                                            
 139. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 141. Frost v. City of Ponca City, No. 47326, 1975 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 103, at *8 (Okla. 
Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1975). 
 142. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934); see also State v. Layne, 623 
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (noting that “[t]he maxim arose largely from dicta, 
since the early cases were limited to facts and conditions close to earth and did not require an 
adjudication of the title to the ‘mansions in the sky’” (citing Thrasher, 173 S.E. at 825)). 
 143. Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc., 237 S.E.2d 171, 181 (Va. 1977) 
(“The common law rule that the owner of land held title to all below it to the center of the earth and 
all above it to the limits of the sky has been modified so that now the landowner is generally held to 
own only that amount of airspace he can reasonably use.”); see also George Gleason Bogert, Problems 
in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 271, 296 (1921) (observing, in the context of airspace rights, that 
the maxim “cujus est solum is not law, but is merely a nice theory, easily passed down from mediaeval 
days because there has not been until recently any occasion to apply it to its full extent”). 
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Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in United States v. Causby,146 where the 
Court observed: “It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of 
the land extended to the periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum ejus 
est usque ad coelum.  But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.”147 
The same analysis should logically apply to subsurface rights.  The deep-
est subsurface dispute ever litigated in the United States occurred in Nunez 
v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.,148 in which the defendant drilled an oil well 
that first entered the plaintiff’s land about two miles below the surface.149  
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a normal surface 
owner would hold title to the center of the earth,150 it held that specialized 
state statutes superseded subsurface property rights in designated oil pro-
duction regions, and accordingly rejected the plaintiff’s trespass claim.151  
Even if we charitably characterize the court’s endorsement of the center of 
the earth theory as a holding, any suggestion that this approach extends 
into the crust below two miles is mere dicta, which binds no one.  Human 
activity has, quite literally, barely scratched the surface of our planet.152 
2. Statutory Failures 
A small group of states have adopted legislation that addresses the gen-
eral extent153 of subsurface property rights.  But these statutes are ambiguous 
at best and do little to resolve the problems inherent in Blackstone’s theory. 
                                                                                                                            
 146. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 147. Id. at 260–61. 
 148. 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986). 
 149. Id. at 956. 
 150. Much of the law governing subsurface rights in Louisiana is statutory.  The Nunez court 
relied on Louisiana Civil Code article 490 (2007), which provides, in part: ‘“Unless otherwise 
provided by law, the ownership of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of everything that is 
directly above it or under it.’”  488 So. 2d at 959 n.9 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490).  Thus, 
the statute fails to the answer the basic question: How far down do property rights go?  The court 
apparently assumed that the statute extended property rights to the center of the earth.  See id. 
 151. 488 So. 2d at 963–64. 
 152. Perhaps the most famous subsurface rights case is Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1929), involving title to the Great Onyx Cave, which is approximately 360 feet underground.  
While the majority suggested that the cave belonged to the surface owners under the center of the 
earth standard, id. at 620, the dissent favored the owner who owned the cave entrance: 
It sounds well in the majority opinion to tritely say that he who owns the surface of real 
estate . . . owns from the center of the earth to the outmost sentinel of the solar system.  
The age-old statement, adhered to in the majority opinion as the law, in truth and fact, is 
not true now and never has been. 
Id. at 622 (Logan, J., dissenting). 
 153. By “general extent,” I mean to exclude statutes that address specific subsurface rights, 
such as ownership of groundwater, regulation of oil and gas production, or the like.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 182–183, 199–202. 
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Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota all 
utilize virtually the same statutory text, providing that the surface owner “has 
the right to the surface and to everything permanently situated beneath or 
above it.”154  However, they fail to define how far downward the owner’s 
rights extend.  As a result, some courts apply the center of the earth standard 
to interpret this language.155  Accordingly, the dicta analysis above is equally 
applicable to these judicial pronouncements: None of these cases has adju-
dicated rights below two miles. 
The confusion is more pronounced in jurisdictions such as Alabama, 
California, Georgia, and Idaho.  Although the precise language varies 
somewhat, here the relevant statutes share the theme that property rights 
extend downward “indefinitely” or “for an indefinite distance.”156  Taken 
literally, this language creates two difficulties.  First, it suggests that the 
surface owner holds title to a subsurface pillar that is equal in width and 
breadth to his surface parcel, akin to a cylinder rather than a pyramid.  
Because the earth is round, the theoretical pillars of different owners would 
quickly intersect with each other—an absurd result.  Second, a subsurface 
pillar of infinite length would pass through the center of the earth and exit 
the land surface in a direct line below.  For example, this view would 
give an Alabama landowner exclusive rights to the surface of land in 
China—another logical absurdity.157  It is a fundamental precept that a statute 
                                                                                                                            
 154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-101 (2006); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 47-01-12 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 64 (West 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 43-16-1 (1997).  All five statutes appear to share a common origin.  The Louisiana statute essen-
tially repeats the text of Section 552 of the French Civil Code of 1804.  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] bk. 
II, tit. 1, § 552.  It appears that this French Civil Code section was incorporated into Dudley Field’s 
model Civil Code, which was in turn adopted in California, and thence spread to the other listed 
states.  Ironically, California amended its parallel statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 659, in 1963 to add the 
“indefinite distance” language, thus creating the difficulties discussed in the text accompanying notes 
156–158.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 659 (West 2007). 
 155. See, e.g., Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 955. 
 156. ALA. CODE § 6-5-210 (1993) (“downwards and upwards indefinitely”); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 659 (West 2007) (“an indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards”); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-
2(b) (1991) (“extends downward indefinitely and upwards indefinitely”); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 55-101A (2007) (“an indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards”). 
 157. In addition, a number of states have enacted either the Uniform Condominium Act or the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.  Both of these acts include an explanatory note—adopted 
by some, but not all, enacting states—that provides, in pertinent part: “Where real estate is described 
in only two dimensions (length and width), it is correctly assumed that the property extends 
indefinitely above the earth’s surface and downwards to a point in the center of the planet.”  See, 
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-1-103 cmt. 12 (2003).  It might be argued that this reference provides 
indirect evidence of legislative intent to adopt the center of the earth approach outside of the 
condominium context. 
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should be interpreted, if possible, to avoid an absurd conclusion.158  To 
date, no court has attempted to apply these statutes in a deep subsurface 
dispute, so their precise downward reach remains unclear.  At a minimum, 
however, they cannot be viewed as statutory endorsements of the center 
of the earth approach. 
B. The Theory Ignored: In the Shallow Crust 
Hundreds of American appellate decisions have recited “center of the 
earth” language—in English, Latin, or both—in connection with disputes 
within the region between the land surface and a point two miles deep.  
These cases may be divided into two categories.159 
One group of cases involves uses either at160 or a few feet below the 
surface, such as tree roots161 or sewer lines.162  Courts in such cases often 
cite the center of the earth theory to justify protecting the surface owner’s 
rights, even though this usage goes well beyond the needs of the 
immediate case.  Here, the doctrine functions merely as a convenient 
shorthand for the idea that a landowner owns the subsurface to the 
extent necessary to support normal and reasonable uses of the surface.163  
Few would disagree with this general proposition of law.164  Indeed, it is 
                                                                                                                            
 158. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 n.9 (2000) (‘“[N]othing is better settled, 
than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative 
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion[.]’”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897))). 
 159. Of course, many courts also include center of the earth rhetoric in decisions in which 
subsurface rights are not at issue.  See, e.g., Templeton v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 650 S.W.2d 743, 
758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting a challenge to the denial of a liquor license application). 
 160. Courts dealing with surface water rights or surface flooding disputes frequently observe 
that the title of the surface owner extends from the heavens to the center of the earth, sometimes 
using the full Latin maxim.  See, e.g., Orr v. Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007); Grosso v. 
Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Dist. Ct. 1980).  It is not always clear which prong 
of the doctrine these courts are using in such disputes, the air rights portion or the subsurface portion. 
 161. See, e.g., Harding v. Bethesda Reg’l Cancer Treatment Ctr., 551 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1989). 
 162. See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa 2004). 
 163. Of course, this right is subject to various restrictions, such as those imposed by land use 
regulations.  See, e.g., Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (App. Div. 1948) 
(upholding an ordinance that prohibited the plaintiff from removing topsoil from land zoned for 
agricultural purposes, because “the old absolute ownership from the center of the earth usque ad 
coelum has given way to a variety of new needs and to a broadened concept of duty to neighbor”). 
 164. But cf. First Unitarian Soc’y v. Citizens’ Sav. & Trust Co., 142 N.W. 87, 92 (Iowa 
1913) (holding that the presence of a public sewer pipe six feet below the land surface did not breach 
the grantor’s covenant against encumbrances, despite a vigorous dissent that ownership to the center 
of the earth is “hornbook law”). 
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quite consistent with the near-surface standard used by early English com-
mon law before Blackstone’s intervention.165 
The second category of cases concerns true subsurface ownership: 
disputes concerning the zone from the near-surface area to two miles 
downward.  Do courts uniformly recognize that the surface owner owns 
this region, as the center of the earth theory would dictate?  The answer to 
this question is a resounding “no.”  Remarkably, when courts directly 
confront the scope of deep subsurface rights, they usually soften or ignore 
the center of the earth approach to the point where the exceptions swallow 
any supposed rule.  Broadly speaking, the deeper the dispute, the less likely 
courts are to recognize the surface owner’s title.  In addition, specialized 
statutes have eroded the center of the earth theory.  Federal and state stat-
utes require that the surface owner obtain a permit before using the subsur-
face for particular purposes.  Because such permits can be denied, the 
government has effectively limited the landowner’s subsurface rights. 
Property is customarily viewed as a metaphorical “bundle of rights.”166  
The most important sticks in this bundle are: (1) the right to use and enjoy; 
(2) the right to exclude; and (3) the right to transfer.167  The analysis below 
demonstrates that the law has largely eviscerated the surface owner’s supposed 
right to use and enjoy the deep subsurface.  Similarly, the owner’s theoreti-
cal right to exclude others from her land is increasingly ignored in the deep 
subsurface, as discussed below.  Certainly, the surface owner retains the 
right to transfer whatever subsurface rights she may have.  But the scope 
of those rights under modern law is so meager that it cannot be fairly char-
acterized as “title.”168 
                                                                                                                            
 165. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 166. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (mentioning the 
“bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”); see also SPRANKLING, supra note 
62, at 4. 
 167. SPRANKLING, supra note 62, at 5. 
 168. The U.S. Supreme Court confronted a somewhat analogous situation in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  There, a New York statute authorized 
cable television companies to install cables and related equipment on any privately owned rental 
property without the owner’s consent, in exchange for nominal consideration.  The Supreme Court 
held that the statute was a taking because it “effectively destroys” key ownership rights: “[T]he owner 
has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the 
occupier from possession . . . .”  Id. at 435.  The Court noted that although the owner retained 
“the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer,” the occupation of that space by 
a stranger “will ordinarily empty the right of any value.”  Id. at 436. 
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1. The Right to Use and Enjoy 
The right to use and enjoy is perhaps the most important stick in the 
metaphorical bundle.  As Coke asked almost 400 years ago, “what is 
the land but the profits thereof”?169  In the modern era, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized its “abiding concern for the productive use of, and economic 
investment in, land.”170 
American decisions concerning the right to use and enjoy subsurface 
lands address only five main topics: (a) groundwater; (b) oil and gas; (c) hard 
rock minerals, such as gold; (d) objects embedded in the soil; and (e) waste 
disposal.  In fact, these are the only economically productive uses of the 
subsurface currently possible, other than near-surface uses such as tree roots, 
building foundations, and the like.  When assembled like pieces of a jigsaw 
puzzle, these decisions reveal a picture of subsurface ownership that is 
inconsistent with the center of the earth theory. 
a. Groundwater 
For centuries, landowners have utilized wells to extract percolating 
groundwater for use on the surface of their lands for purposes such as 
agriculture, industry, and mining.  The center of the earth approach logi-
cally means that each surface owner is entitled to the particular groundwater 
underneath his or her land.  Thus, for example, adjoining owners A and B 
would each be entitled to withdraw the groundwater beneath their respec-
tive parcels.  Conversely, if A’s pumping attracted the groundwater from 
B’s land, then B could recover damages for the seizure of her property.  
But most jurisdictions refuse to recognize that a person like B owns the 
groundwater under her land.  In general, the center of the earth theory 
does not apply to groundwater. 
Ironically, the earliest approach to groundwater ownership—variously 
called the “absolute ownership” or “absolute dominion” rule171—purported 
to apply the center of the earth standard.  In 1843, the English case of 
Acton v. Blundell172 concluded that ownership of groundwater “falls within 
that principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his 
                                                                                                                            
 169. 1 COKE, supra note 13, at 4.b. 
 170. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992). 
 171. See, e.g., Hawley v. Kansas Dep’t Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 879 (Kan. 2006) (discussing 
history of “absolute ownership” doctrine); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ohio 
2005) (discussing history of “absolute dominion” standard). 
 172. (1843) 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223. 
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surface . . . whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or 
part soil, part water.”173  But the Acton court then leaped to the conclusion 
that the surface owner could remove as much groundwater as he wished, 
even if this “intercepts or drains off the water collected . . . in his neigh-
bor’s well.”174 
Despite the misleading title of this doctrine, the surface owner did not 
in fact “own” the water in place under his land.175  Title to groundwater 
was obtained only by removing it from the subsurface and thus convert-
ing it into personal property.  This was a variant on the familiar rule of 
capture: Groundwater was owned by the first captor regardless of who owned 
the land surface.176  Thus, the surface owner merely had a right to attempt 
to capture groundwater. 
Beginning in the 1850s, American courts gradually adopted the 
misnamed absolute ownership approach until it became the clear majority 
rule.177  However, during the twentieth century most states abandoned this 
                                                                                                                            
 173. Id. at 1235. 
 174. Id.  Some authorities have suggested that the absolute ownership approach resulted from 
an inadequate understanding of groundwater hydrology.  See, e.g., Vill. of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet 
Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1979) (attributing the English rule to “[t]echnological ignorance 
about the existence, origin, movement and course of percolating ground waters”); State v. Michels 
Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Wis. 1974) (“The basis for this rule . . . was a feeling 
that the ways of underground water were too mysterious and unpredictable to allow the establish-
ment of adequate and fair rules for regulation of competing rights to such water.”). 
 175. See 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 63, at 763 (observing that the name 
of the doctrine is misleading for this reason); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 
481, 498 (suggesting that the absolute ownership rule creates no water rights).  As the California 
Supreme Court lamented over a century ago in Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903), under the 
absolute ownership rule 
[t]he field is open for exploitation to every man who covets the possessions of another, 
or the water which sustains and preserves them, and he is at liberty to take that water if he 
has the means to do so, and no law will prevent or interfere with him, or preserve his victim 
from the attack. 
Id. at 769; see also Meeker v. City of East Orange, 74 A. 379,  384 (N.J. 1909) (noting that it is 
impossible to allow adjoining landowners “the absolute right to withdraw . . . all percolating water 
which may be reached by a well or pump upon any one of the several lots, for such withdrawal by one 
owner necessarily interferes to some extent with the enjoyment of the like privilege . . . by the 
other owners”). 
 176. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts observed, “[a]though framed in property lan-
guage, the [absolute ownership] rule was in reality a rule of capture, for a landowner’s pump could 
induce water under the land of his neighbor to flow to his well—water that was in theory the 
neighbor’s property while it remained in place.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 857 
introductory note (1979). 
 177. See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 304 (1861); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 
49, 54–55 (1855); see also 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 20.04, at 20-14 (Robert E. Beck 
ed., 1991 ed., 2003 repl. vol.).  Some American courts relied on the ad inferos maxim to justify their 
adoption of this approach.  See, e.g., Meeker, 74 A. at 384. 
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harsh standard.178  Today, there are three main approaches to groundwater 
ownership: (1) reasonable use; (2) permit; or (3) correlative rights.  The vast 
majority of jurisdictions follow either the reasonable use or the permit 
approaches, both of which ignore the center of the earth theory. 
Many states follow the reasonable use (or American) approach, or a 
variant of this view based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.179  This 
view has been seen as an abandonment of the center of the earth approach.  
As one court explained, “[t]he so-called ‘American’ . . . rule rejected the ‘to 
the sky and to the depths’ notion for another maxim, ‘use your own prop-
erty so as not to injure that of another.’”180  At bottom, this is just a more 
equitable variant on the absolute ownership rule, which similarly requires 
capture, but somewhat limits how the water is to be used.  Thus, the 
reasonable use approach ignores the center of the earth theory just as 
the absolute ownership view does: Under both systems, the surface owner 
does not own the water under her land.181 
In other jurisdictions, title to groundwater is vested by statute in the 
state, not the surface owner.  Thus, ownership rights in groundwater 
can be obtained only through a permit from the state, regardless of who 
owns the land surface.182  This 
new and revolutionary concept . . . was a complete reversal of [prior judi-
cial decisions], in which repeatedly it had been held that the owner of 
the land owned the water beneath, as an adjunct of the ancient maxim 
“cujus est solum, ejus usque ad coelum et ad inferos,” extending ownership 
from the center of the earth upwards to the sky’s limit.183 
Finally, perhaps four states184 follow the correlative rights doctrine, 
under which each surface owner is entitled to a proportional share of the 
underlying groundwater.  This view approximates the center of the earth 
                                                                                                                            
 178. Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 666. 
 179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 857 (1979).  See generally 6 THOMPSON ON 
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 63, §§ 50.11(f), 50.00(h). 
 180. Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 666 (citations omitted). 
 181. See, e.g., id. at 668 (“The right to use water does not carry with it ownership of the water 
lying under the land.”); see also Smith v. Summit County, 721 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998) (“[L]andowners have no title interest in the ground water underlying their properties.”). 
 182. As one commentator noted, “[u]nder these codes, the right to the water obviously is not 
considered part of the land ownership interest and must be separately acquired through compli-
ance with the criteria established by the code.”  9 POWELL, supra note 65, § 65.08[3], at 65–144; see, 
e.g., F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Kan. 1981) (recognizing that a statutory 
requirement that a surface owner obtain a permit in order to use groundwater is inconsistent with the 
maxim “to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths”). 
 183. Cook v. Tracy, 313 P.2d 803, 803 (Utah 1957). 
 184. 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 177, § 21.01, at 21–5. 
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theory,185 in that ownership of the surface carries with it a defined enti-
tlement to groundwater. 
In summary, today most states reject the center of the earth approach 
to groundwater ownership.186  It arguably survives only in the few jurisdic-
tions that follow the correlative rights theory.  Groundwater decisions 
do occasionally refer to the ad inferos maxim or to center of the earth own-
ership, but usually in the context of explaining that the absolute ownership 
theory is obsolete. 
b. Oil and Gas 
Under the center of the earth theory, owner A would own the oil and 
gas underlying his land surface, just as his neighbor B would hold title to the 
oil and gas beneath her land.  Thus, if A operated an oil well that first 
withdrew the oil from under his land, and then also removed the oil from 
B’s subsurface, A would be liable to B in damages.  But the principles gov-
erning ownership of oil and gas effectively reject this center of the earth 
approach.187  Much like the framework regulating groundwater, the basic 
rule is that property rights in oil and gas are acquired only by capture—that 
is, by removing them from the ground and thus converting them into 
personal property. 
In the 1889 decision of Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. 
v. DeWitt,188 one of the first appellate cases to address the issue, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that oil and natural gas were much 
like fugitive wild animals.  Accordingly, possession of the land surface was 
“not necessarily possession of the [underlying] gas . . . . [because if] an 
adjoining . . . owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes 
                                                                                                                            
 185. See City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm’n, 30 Haw. 912, 924 (1929) 
(noting that the correlative rights doctrine is “[a] much closer approach to adherence to the ancient 
maxim . . . that he who owns a piece of land owns it to the center of the earth”). 
 186. A related issue is whether a landowner is liable in tort if the removal of groundwater 
from his land causes physical injury to the land of another.  Although the center of the earth theory 
would suggest that an owner may do anything he wishes with the subsurface, most courts would apply 
nuisance principles in this situation.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 
900 (Ala. 1980) (applying nuisance law where groundwater removal during operation of the 
defendant’s quarry caused sinkholes that damaged the plaintiffs’ houses). 
 187. Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927), symbolizes the 
judicial inconsistency about the center of the earth theory: “The [surface] owner in fee owns to 
the center of the earth.  But he does not own a specific cubic foot of water, oil, or gas under the 
earth until he reduces it to possession.”  Id. at 745. 
 188. 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889). 
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into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.”189  As 
another court later explained, “[r]igid adherence to the [center of the earth] 
doctrine would have exposed the landowner to liability for wrongful taking 
of oil and gas.”190  It was accordingly necessary to jettison that doctrine. 
Consistent with the capture rule, some states follow the “nonownership” 
theory with respect to oil and gas.191  Under this view, surface owner A enjoys 
a right to remove oil and gas from beneath his property, but does not own 
those resources until they are captured.192  Of course, if A’s neighbor B uses 
wells on her property to withdraw all the oil and gas from beneath A’s land 
before A exercises his right, then A has no claim against B.  Just as a 
fisherman has a license to seek fish—rather than title to any particular 
fish—A merely has a right to hunt for oil, not title to oil.193  A few states 
modify this approach by giving the surface owner a right to sue to prevent 
injury to or waste of subsurface oil and gas reservoirs, but similarly provide 
that that the owner does not hold title to those minerals.194 
The other main approach—followed by a majority of states—is the 
confusingly named “ownership-in-place” theory.195  This theory views oil and 
gas as part of the real property underlying the land surface, and thus as 
“owned” by the surface owner.196  But this supposed ownership is purely 
rhetorical, because the oil and gas underlying the land of any surface owner 
may be freely captured by others, just as in nonownership jurisdictions.197  As 
one treatise notes, the “ownership-in-place” approach has been criticized 
as “contrary to the essential characteristic of ownership, viz., the right of an 
                                                                                                                            
 189. Id. at 725.  In the same vein, another court criticized the idea that the surface owner 
owned the natural gas under his land as being so “unreasonable and untenable as to say that the air 
and the sunshine which float over the owner’s land is a part of the land, and is the property of the 
owner of the land.”  State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812 (Ind. 1898). 
 190. Knighton v. Texaco Producing, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 686, 689 (W.D. La. 1991). 
 191. See generally RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 32–33 (3d ed. 
1991); 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.1 (2002). 
 192. See, e.g., Cont’l Res. of Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Methane, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2006) (“Oil and gas are incapable of ownership until actually found and produced.”). 
 193. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 191, at 27 (noting that the surface owner merely holds “a 
right to search for and reduce the oil and gas to possession”). 
 194. See id. 
 195. See generally id. at 29–31; WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 191, at § 203.3. 
 196. Indeed, this view has been called “an adaptation of the common law maxim cujus est 
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.”  HEMINGWAY, supra note 191, at 30. 
 197. See 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 63, at 240.  As one treatise summarizes: 
Under this rule, absent some state regulation of drilling practices, a landowner, however 
small his tract and wherever located . . . may drill as many wells on his land as he pleases 
and at such locations as meet his fancy and is not liable to adjacent landowners whose lands 
are drained as a result of such operations. 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 191, at § 204.4. 
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owner to follow and to re-acquire his property from one who has removed it 
without permission.”198  Thus, “ownership in place” is not ownership at all. 
Today these common law rules are increasingly modified by statutes 
that promote governmental intervention in oil and gas production at the 
expense of traditional property rights.  For example, in oil and gas regions it 
is common to inject salt water or other liquids into the subsurface in order 
to create underground pressure that facilitates oil or gas production.199  But 
federal law prohibits the surface owner from drilling an injection well for 
this purpose without a special permit;200 thus, access to the subsurface is 
controlled by government.  Similarly, statutes in many states provide for 
the “pooling” or “unitization” of parcels owned by different surface owners 
in order to create a more efficient system for oil or gas production, sometimes 
over the objection of certain owners.201  As one Louisiana court noted, these 
statutes effectively amend the “general concept of ownership of the 
subsurface by the surface owner of the land” because that owner cannot 
“rely on a concept of individual ownership to thwart the common right to 
the resource.”202 
c. Hard Rock Minerals 
Comprehensive mining laws were first adopted in the United States 
during the nineteenth century, based largely on local mining customs.203  
Broadly speaking, judicial decisions discussing ownership of hard rock 
minerals tend to assume that the area is governed by the center of the 
earth theory, even though the deepest mine in the United States extends 
                                                                                                                            
 198. HEMINGWAY, supra note 191, at 32.  One early scholar expressed the same critique in 
more pointed language, noting that using an absolute ownership approach to justify capturing the oil 
and gas of another 
forms an anomalous exception that destroys the principle itself, forms a rule violative of the 
plainest principles of justice and equity, acknowledges the weakness of the law to enforce 
defined rights of property, and makes that relic of barbarism, “The simple plan, That they 
should take who have the power, And they should keep who can,” the basis of the law of 
property in oil and gas. 
W.L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L.J. 174, 179 (1919). 
 199. See Ana Boswell Schepens, Comment, Prospecting for Oil at the Courthouse: Recovery 
for Drainage Caused by Secondary Recovery Operations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 603, 607–08 (1999). 
 200. 40 C.F.R. § 144.31(a) (2006). 
 201. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3321 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-45 (2001). 
 202. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 964 (La. 1986).  However, where 
pooling or unitization does occur, whether by agreement or by compulsion, the result tends to be a 
more equitable distribution of revenues from oil or gas production, often taking into account the size 
of each surface parcel.  See generally W.L. SUMMERS, 1 THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 5.1–5.54 (3d 
ed. 2004). 
 203. See 1 CURTIS H. LINDLEY, LINDLEY ON MINES § 10 (2d ed. 1903). 
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downward only about 1.5 miles.204  Accordingly, decisions often state or imply 
that the surface owner holds title to all gold, silver, coal, and other hard rock 
minerals underneath his land.205  However, there are significant exceptions to 
this approach. 
One key exception is the doctrine of extralateral rights.  Most hard rock 
mining operations in the United States are based on mining claims to pub-
lic lands.  Under federal law, property rights in minerals on these lands are 
governed by the underground structure of the mineral deposit, not by who 
holds a mining claim to the subsurface.206  Thus, for example, if the top (or 
apex) of a gold vein is found on A’s mining claim, then A has the right to mine 
the entirety of the vein, even if it extends through B’s adjacent claim; B has 
no right to recover the value of the gold that A removes from the subsur-
face.207  Early courts frankly recognized that the doctrine deviated from center 
of the earth theory,208 but defended it as necessary to promote mineral 
production.209  It was eventually codified as federal law governing mining 
claims on public lands.210 
In a similar fashion, federal, state, and local laws restrict the ability of a 
landowner to mine even on wholly private lands.211  For example, federal 
                                                                                                                            
 204. The deepest mine in the United States is the now-closed Homestake Mine in South 
Dakota, which reached a depth of 2438 meters, or just over 8000 feet (1.52 miles).  John Excell, 
Underground Research: Depth of Knowledge, ENGINEER, Sept. 17, 2007, at 20. 
 205. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Moore, 48 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ill. 1943); Toth v. Bigelow, 
64 A.2d 62, 64 (N.J. 1949). 
 206. 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2000). 
 207. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 37.01 (Cheryl Outerbridge ed., 2d ed. 
2007); John C. Lacy, The Historic Origins of the U.S. Mining Laws and Proposals for Change, 10 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 13, 16–19 (1995). 
 208. In fact, the extralateral rights doctrine apparently stems from mining customs in England 
that date from the thirteenth century.  Lacy, supra note 207, at 15. 
 209. See, e.g., Bullion Mining Co. v. Croesus Gold & Silver Mining Co., 2 Nev. 168, 178 
(1866) (explaining that  “[t]he doctrine of the common law, that he who has a right to the surface of 
any portion of the earth, has also the right to all beneath and above that surface, has but a limited 
application to the rights of miners,” because to “adhere to the common law rules on this subject is 
simply impossible”); see also Collins v. Bailey, 125 P. 543, 548 (Colo. Ct. App. 1912) (discussing 
deviation from the center of the earth theory); Parrot Silver & Copper Co. v. Heinze, 64 P. 326, 329 
(Mont. 1901) (same, except using phrase usque ad coelum et ad orcum); Fitzgerald v. Clark, 42 P. 273, 
282 (Mont. 1895) (same, except using phrase ad coelum et ad orcum). 
 210. 30 U.S.C. § 26; see also 30 U.S.C. § 27 (providing similar right to veins or lodes of 
minerals located within 3000 feet of a mine tunnel). 
 211. For example, local zoning laws may ban all mining activities in certain areas.  See, 
e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996) (upholding an 
ordinance that eliminated mining as a permitted use).  Similarly, state environmental statutes may 
impose other hurdles, such as prohibiting mining that may have a significant adverse impact on 
the natural environment.  See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2007) (requiring the 
preparation of an environmental impact report for any privately owned project that requires discre-
tionary governmental approval if the project might have an adverse impact on the environment); 
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statutes prohibit any surface or subsurface coal mining on private property 
unless the owner obtains a special permit—much like federal regulation of 
oil and gas drilling.212  The surface owner who cannot meet the permit stan-
dards will be unable to remove coal.213  In fact, surface coal mining may be 
completely barred on certain types of private land, including: (1) envi-
ronmentally sensitive regions; (2) lands with historical, cultural, or scientific 
resources; (3) areas that present natural hazards; and (4) lands used for food 
production or as watersheds.214  Thus, despite the center of the earth theory, 
an owner may be legally unable to extract the coal immediately under the 
land surface. 
d. Objects Embedded in the Soil 
The traditional rule was that lost objects found embedded in the soil on 
private land belonged to the landowner, not to the finder—consistent with 
the ad inferos approach.215  For example, in Allred v. Biegel,216 a 1949 Missouri 
court awarded an ancient canoe to the owner of the land under which it 
was found, relying on an almost identical English decision that utilized the 
center of the earth theory.217 
However, in recent decades, about half of the states have enacted stat-
utes that abandon this approach.218  Although these statutes vary somewhat, 
the general pattern is clear: The finder is required to deliver the found object 
to a local law enforcement agency, with the hope that an advertisement will 
                                                                                                                            
id. § 21081 (prohibiting the approval of private projects that cause adverse environmental impacts 
that cannot be mitigated, absent special circumstances). 
 212. 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (requiring a permit for surface coal mining); id. § 1266(b) (requiring a 
permit for underground coal mining). 
 213. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 773.4(a) (2007) (setting permit standards for surface mining).  Federal 
regulations impose extensive conditions on coal mining, particularly on surface mining.  For example, 
the applicant for a surface mining permit must provide a practical plan to (1) restore the land to its 
original use or a better use after the completion of the mining, see id. § 715.13; (2) protect topsoil in 
the mine area, see id. § 715.16; and (3) preserve the integrity of the regional hydrological system, see 
id. § 715.17. 
 214. Id. §§ 762.1–762.11. 
 215. See, e.g., Bishop v. Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (recognizing the rule in 
dispute concerning money found inside a jar partially embedded in soil); Burdick v. Chesebrough, 88 
N.Y.S. 13 (App. Div. 1904) (earthenware); cf. State v. David, 1 Del. Cas. 160 (1797) (apparently 
using the Latin version of the maxim in a criminal case to show that the landowner was in possession 
of stolen goods because they were buried on his land). 
 216. 219 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). 
 217. Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., (1886) L.R. 33 Ch. D. 562 (holding that the surface owner also 
owned a 2000-year-old boat discovered underground). 
 218. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 251–257 (McKinney 1992); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 2080–2080.3 (West 2007). 
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allow the true owner to step forward and claim his property.219  If no one 
claims the object within a set period, it becomes the property of the finder, 
not the landowner. 
Similarly, the center of the earth theory is increasingly rejected in the 
specialized context of Native American artifacts.  In most states, a private 
landowner has no right to disturb Native American burial sites located on or 
under the surface.220  When such a site is discovered, statutes usually require 
that the discovery be reported to a public official, that any construction 
activities cease, and that appropriate measures be taken for reburial of human 
remains, either on site or elsewhere.221  Moreover, in some jurisdictions any 
Native American grave artifacts found on private land belong to either the 
appropriate tribe or the state, not the landowner.222 
e. Waste Disposal 
One potential use for deep subsurface areas is the disposal of chemical 
and industrial wastes.  In the 1930s, certain oil companies began to dispose 
of various liquid oil and gas wastes by injecting them into underground 
wells.223  This practice was adopted over time by other industries,224 leading 
to injection wells over two miles deep.225  The logic of the center of the 
earth theory suggests that the surface owner should have the unfettered 
right to construct and operate such wells.  However, since the 1980s, two 
                                                                                                                            
 219. Id. 
 220. See Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights 
Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363, 376 (1999).  In addition, state environmental laws may prevent the 
excavation of sites containing Native American artifacts or other historical items.  For example, 
under California law an environmental impact report is required for private projects that may have 
a significant adverse impact on the environment.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2007).  
“Environment” in this context includes “the physical conditions which exist within the area 
which will be affected by a proposed project, including . . . objects of historic . . . significance.”  Id. 
§ 21060.5.  A project that has adverse impacts on historic resources may be prohibited.  See, e.g., 
Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Ct. App. 2007) (prohibiting the 
demolition of a historic mansion). 
 221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.05(1)–(4) (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1205, 
12-1208 (2006); see also David J. Harris, Note, Respect for the Living and Respect for the 
Dead: Return of Indian and Other Native American Burial Remains, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 195, 213–18 (1991) (collecting state statutes). 
 222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (2000) (property of state).  But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-
6-11.2G (West 2004) (allowing the landowner to keep artifacts under certain conditions). 
 223. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLASS I UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM: 
STUDY OF THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLASS I UNDERGROUND INJECTION WELLS 5 (2001), 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/study_uic-class1_study_risks_class1.pdf. 
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. at 12. 
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federal statutes—the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act226 and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act227—have increasingly restricted this practice.228  
Today, a landowner may not use a well to inject any liquid or gas under 
her land without a special permit from the federal government or, in some 
instances, an authorized state agency.229  In effect, the government licenses 
access to the subsurface for this purpose.230 
This regulatory program is flatly inconsistent with the center of 
the earth theory, because many owners will be unable to satisfy the per-
mit requirements.231  For instance, even if an owner meets all other permit 
requirements, the subsurface injection of various hazardous substances is pro-
hibited232 unless the owner also qualifies for a special exemption.233  To secure 
the exemption, the owner must prove that there will be “no migration” 
of hazardous materials from the injection area “for as long as the waste 
remains hazardous.”234  This standard requires the owner to establish, among 
other things, that for 10,000 years the hazardous wastes will not migrate 
either (1) vertically out of the injection zone; or (2) laterally to interface 
with an underground aquifer that is suitable for use as a supply of drinking 
water.235  In part because of the difficulty of meeting this standard, there 
are only 123 hazardous waste injection wells in the United States.236 
                                                                                                                            
 226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2000). 
 227. Id. §§ 300f–300j. 
 228. See generally Earle A. Herbert, The Regulation of Deep-Well Injection: A Changing 
Environment Beneath the Surface, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 190–98 (1996); see also JOHN G. 
SPRANKLING & GREGORY S. WEBER, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES IN A NUTSHELL 220–22, 234–42 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the impact of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act on land disposal of hazardous wastes). 
 229. 40 C.F.R. § 144.11 (2006).  The prohibition extends to “any material or substance which 
flows or moves whether in semisolid, liquid, sludge, gas, or any other form or state.”  Id. § 144.3; see, 
e.g., Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals LP v. EPA, No. 05-74742, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2817 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2006) (rejecting a landowner’s application for a preliminary injunction against 
the EPA’s approval of a hazardous waste injection well project on an adjacent parcel); Chance v. BP 
Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996) (involving a chemical refining plant whose employees 
disposed of hazardous wastes by using injection wells authorized by permits from the Ohio and 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agencies). 
 230. Similarly, federal law bars a property owner from placing any “noncontainerized or 
bulk liquid hazardous waste” in any mine, cave, salt dome formation, or salt bed formation.  40 
C.F.R. § 264.18 (c). 
 231. See, e.g., Hunter Indus. Facilities, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 910 
S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App. 1995) (upholding the denial of permits for injection wells and related facilities); 
United Res. Recovery, Inc. v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 815 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App. 1991) (same). 
 232. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 148.11–148.18. 
 233. Id. § 148.20(a). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. § 148.20(a)(1)(i). 
 236. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 223, at 3. 
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f. Occupying the Subsurface 
Even if the law constrains the ability of a landowner to derive economic 
profit from the subsurface, one might still ask: Can the surface owner at least 
occupy it?  For example, could the surface owner dig a mile-deep hole on her 
land and construct a small dwelling at the bottom, thereby asserting her 
theoretical ownership?237 
A multitude of legal barriers would probably derail any such effort.  
First, most jurisdictions would require that the owner obtain a grading 
permit before any digging began, because “excavation” is viewed as one type 
of “grading.”238  In order to obtain a grading permit for a project of such 
magnitude, the owner would have to demonstrate the safety of the project by 
submitting a soils engineering report and potentially a liquefaction study.239  
In some jurisdictions, the excavation would also trigger review under the 
appropriate environmental impact review system, potentially requiring 
the preparation of an environmental impact report.240  Depending on the 
results from these various reports, the project might well be disallowed by 
local officials.  Even if the proposed excavation passed regulatory review, the 
landowner might be dissuaded from proceeding by the risk of tort liability 
                                                                                                                            
 237. Admittedly, some unusual uses are uniquely suited to the subsurface.  The National Science 
Foundation plans to construct a Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory within the 
now-closed Homestake gold mine in South Dakota, the deepest mine in the United States, in order 
to conduct experiments relating to astrophysics and astronomy away from the cosmic rays and 
other radiation that strikes the earth’s surface.  See Excell, supra note 204.  One portion of the 
laboratory will be 7400 feet below the surface, making it the deepest laboratory in the world, and 
probably the deepest structure occupied by humans in the United States.  Id.  Even at the compara-
tively shallow 8000 foot depth of the mine, the temperature is already 57°C—while federal standards 
recommend that no worker be exposed to workplace heat of over 40°C.  Id.; see also infra note 292. 
 238. See, e.g., Int’l Code Council, INT’L BLDG. CODE app. J §§ J102.1, J103.1–.2 (2006) 
(requiring grading permit generally for any “excavation or fill or combination thereof,” but providing 
exceptions for certain types of excavations, none of which apply here). 
 239. Id. §§ J104.3–.4. 
 240. As noted above, see supra note 220, California law requires the preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact report for any private project that might have a significant adverse effect on the 
environment.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(a) (West 2007).  The construction of a shaft one mile 
deep would raise at least three concerns: (1) potential injury to groundwater resources; (2) noise and 
traffic impacts from the excavation process; and (3) possible damage caused by the disposal of 
excavation wastes.  For instance, assuming a simple shaft merely twenty feet wide and twenty feet 
broad, this would produce over 74,000 cubic yards of excavation wastes; how would they be dealt 
with?  In Day v. City of Glendale, 124 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Ct. App. 1975), the court held that an 
environmental impact report was required for a grading project that involved the excavation of 
343,000 cubic yards of soil.  In like manner, a similar report logically would be required for the 
hypothetical shaft.  See also No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(discussing the adequacy of an environmental impact report for a project to drill exploratory oil wells 
downward for 10,000 feet). 
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stemming from her duty to provide lateral support to neighboring lands, her 
duty to avoid undue injury to the groundwater table, or other obligations.  Of 
course, local zoning ordinances conceivably might prohibit any excavation 
at all.241  More fundamentally, even if the hole could be dug, the detailed 
requirements of the standard building code would render construction of a 
dwelling virtually impossible absent a variance.242 
2. The Right to Exclude 
At common law, a landowner held a virtually absolute right to exclude 
others from his land.  Even today, as the Supreme Court has observed, the 
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property.”243  Consistent with this view, 
American courts have routinely found a trespass for intentional physical 
intrusions in the near-surface zone.244  Typical examples include building 
foundations, tree roots, or pipe lines that extend from land owned by A into 
land owned by B, almost always within one hundred feet of the surface.245 
This absolutist common law right evolved in cases concerning surface 
intrusions.  Blackstone observed that every person’s land was “inclosed and 
set apart from his neighbor’s . . . either by a visible and material fence, as one 
field is divided from another by a hedge; or, by an ideal, invisible bound-
ary . . . as when one man’s land adjoins to another’s in the same field.”246  
Thus, Blackstone’s fence, whether tangible or imaginary, only spanned the 
                                                                                                                            
 241. An example is Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1948), where the 
court upheld the validity of an ordinance that prohibited an owner from removing the topsoil from 
land zoned for agriculture.  The court reasoned that “the old absolute ownership from the center 
of the earth usque a coelum has given way to a variety of new needs and to a broadened concept of 
duty to neighbors.”  Id. at 817; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) 
(upholding an ordinance that limited the depth of excavation); 1 ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS § 6.02[2] (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2007) (generally discussing 
underground zoning ordinances). 
 242. See, e.g., INT’L BLDG. CODE § 1007 (“accessible means of egress”); id. § 1024 (“exit 
discharge”) (2006). 
 243. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998). 
 244. One of the best known—and deepest—intrusions of this type is found in Edwards v. 
Lee’s Administrators, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936), involving the Great Onyx Cave, which is 
noted for its rock crystal formations 360 feet below the surface. 
 245. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.  But see First Unitarian Soc’y v. 
Citizens’ Sav. & Trust Co., 142 N.W. 87 (Iowa 1913) (finding no breach of warranty against 
encumbrances based on the presence of a public sewer pipe six feet below the land surface, 
despite the dissent’s plea that “hornbook law” states that the surface owner’s rights extend to the 
center of the earth). 
 246. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *209–10. 
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land surface.  In this setting, it was perhaps logical to insist on the surface 
owner’s near-absolute right to exclude others in order to maximize the 
productive use of land.247 
However, the handful of decisions involving the surface owner’s right 
to exclude in the deep subsurface reveal quite a different pattern.248  
Increasingly, modern courts restrict or ignore this theoretical right, as 
reflected in a series of cases concerning (a) oil and gas operations; and 
(b) migrating wastes.249  Accordingly, as the Ohio Supreme Court explained 
while rejecting a trespass claim based on events that occurred about 2800 feet 
deep, it is appropriate to extend the concept “that absolute ownership of 
air rights is a doctrine which ‘has no place in the modern world,’ to apply as 
well to ownership of deep subsurface rights.”250 
a. Oil and Gas Operations 
Oil and gas companies routinely inject liquids into the subsurface to 
enhance oil and gas production, as noted above.251  Suppose A injects salt 
water 2000 feet below his land in order to boost oil recovery.  When the 
injected water foreseeably migrates underneath the land surface owned by 
B, can B sue A in trespass? 
Logically, the center of the earth theory should allow B to exclude A’s 
injectate.  An actor is liable for trespass if he intentionally “enters land in the 
possession of the other, or causes a thing . . . to do so,” regardless of whether it 
causes any harm.252  In this context, “intent” merely means “knowledge that 
                                                                                                                            
 247. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32–34 (6th ed. 2003). 
 248. Most authorities suggest that the owner’s right to exclude others from the subsurface is equally 
as strong as his right to exclude others from the surface.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 159(1) (1965) (stating that except as limited by subsection 2, dealing with airspace, “a 
trespass may be committed on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth”); HARPER ET AL., supra 
note 66, § 1.5 (“It is a trespass to make an entry below the surface of another’s land for any rea-
son not justifiable as an entry on the surface.”).  But see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 
112 (2000) (“A tunnel hundreds of feet below the surface that does not affect the value of the land 
or remove minerals probably should not be regarded as a trespass.”). 
 249. The same tendency to restrict the right to exclude in the deep subsurface occasionally 
appears in other contexts.  See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch, 
LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 710 (Colo. 2002) (“We reject the Landowners’ claim that the cujus doctrine 
provides them with a property right to require consent for artificial recharge and storage of water in 
aquifers that extend through their land.”); Boehringer v. Montalto, 254 N.Y.S. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1931) 
(finding that an easement for a sewer over 150 feet below the surface did not breach the grantor’s 
warranty against encumbrances, because it would not affect the grantee’s use of land). 
 250. Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996). 
 251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158; see also DOBBS, supra note 248, § 50 
(discussing the elements of trespass to land). 
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[an act] will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign mat-
ter.”253  If A injects salt water knowing that it will eventually enter strata 
underneath the surface owned by B, this would seem to constitute a trespass. 
But a number of decisions refuse to impose trespass liability in this 
situation, especially where A’s action is either authorized by a state agency 
or located within a unitized production zone.254  The foundation for these 
decisions is the public policy encouraging oil and gas production, which 
outweighs an owner’s traditional right to exclude.  As the Texas Supreme 
Court explained in one case, “[t]he orthodox rules and principles applied 
by the courts as regards surface invasions of land may not be appropri-
ately applied to subsurface invasions as arise out of the secondary recovery 
of natural resources.”255  This approach is sometimes characterized as a “nega-
tive rule of capture.”256 
A few decisions have extended this principle even to physical intru-
sions by drilling equipment.257  For example, in Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas 
Co.,258 the plaintiff relied on the center of the earth theory to argue that a 
trespass occurred when the defendant oil company drilled a bore that first 
reached his land at a point about two miles below the surface in a unitized 
oil field.  But the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this claim on the basis 
that the statutes authorizing unitization superseded the “general concept of 
ownership of the subsurface by the surface owner of the land.”259 
b. Migrating Wastes 
Suppose that A disposes of liquid wastes by injecting them deep beneath 
her land; over time, the wastes foreseeably migrate into a zone under B’s land 
                                                                                                                            
 253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i. 
 254. See, e.g., Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988); 
Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1969); West Edmond Salt Water Disposal 
Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1950); R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 
1962); cf. Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding 
no trespass where the state authorized the defendant to dispose of waste salt water one mile below the 
surface, even though the injectate migrated under the plaintiff’s land). 
 255. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568; see also HEMINGWAY, supra note 191, at 212 (suggesting 
that “it would seem more desirable to classify the intrusion into the adjoining sub-surface as a tres-
pass that was not actionable due to overriding public policy,” rather than to hold, as the Manziel 
court did, that no trespass had occurred). 
 256. See Schepens, supra note 199, at 608. 
 257. See, e.g., Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D. 1997) (holding 
that a statute authorizing pooling superseded a lessee’s right to prevent another from drilling an oil 
well through his leased land and, accordingly, “the property law of trespass” was inapplicable). 
 258. 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986). 
 259. Id. at 964. 
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surface.  Although the center of the earth approach should allow B to 
exclude those wastes—or at least receive compensation for trespass—many 
courts260 provide no relief to the surface owner like B.261 
The leading case is Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,262 in which the 
defendant chemical company disposed of liquid wastes by injecting them 
into a sandstone formation about 2800 feet deep.  The plaintiffs brought a 
class action on behalf of over 20,000 surface owners, raising trespass,263 
nuisance, and other claims stemming from the underground migration of 
the wastes four or five miles in each direction.  On appeal following a 
defense verdict, the plaintiffs argued that “[t]he owner of land has abso-
lute ownership of all the subsurface property,” relying on the familiar ad 
inferos maxim.264  But the court flatly rejected this absolutist claim, noting 
that “ownership rights in today’s world are not so clear-cut as they were 
before the advent of airplanes and injection wells.”265  Rather, analogizing 
to the airplane cases that restricted the ad coelum doctrine, it reasoned that 
“there are also limitations on property owners’ subsurface rights.”266  Accord-
ingly, the court held that the plaintiffs could only “exclude invasions of the 
subsurface property that actually interfere with [their] reasonable and 
foreseeable use of the subsurface.”267  Under this standard, the mere presence 
                                                                                                                            
 260. See, e.g., FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, No. 
03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *4 (Tex. App. Feb. 6, 2003) (dismissing the surface 
owner’s objection to an injection well permit application on the basis that the injection of 
wastewater about 8000 feet deep would not cause injury to the owner’s “existing or intended use 
of the deep subsurface”). 
 261. In contrast, where pollution close to the surface directly interferes with surface uses—for 
example, by polluting groundwater used as drinking water by the surface owner—courts have 
typically provided relief.  See, e.g., The Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 
659 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (granting recovery for an underground toxic plume over one hundred feet 
below the surface); Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984) (holding that the 
saltwater contamination of an aquifer between ten and seventy feet deep was a nuisance); Hoery 
v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the subsurface migration of 
toxic substances that contaminated a well eighty-four feet below the surface was both a 
trespass and a nuisance). 
 262. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996). 
 263. Some jurisdictions approach the issue by treating the subsurface intrusion of migrating 
wastes as an “indirect trespass,” thus requiring that the plaintiff establish “substantial actual damage” 
before trespass liability will attach.  See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 
529–30 (Ala. 1979). 
 264. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 991 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. Id. at 992. 
 266. Id.; see also Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., No. CIV.A. 98-2531, 1999 WL 970354, at *4 
(E.D. La. 1999) (using the Chance standard); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Park County Sportsmen’s 
Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 701 (Colo. 2002) (quoting the Chance standard with approval). 
 267. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 992. 
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of the injectate within the plaintiffs’ subsurface was not sufficient dam-
age to sustain their trespass claim. 
The Chance standard largely eviscerates a surface owner’s right to 
exclude subsurface wastes.  First, only those surface owners who are actively 
using the subsurface for a specific “reasonable and foreseeable” purpose are 
able to bring suit—a small minority.  As between the idle owner of the subsur-
face, on the one hand, and an active intruder who devotes that subsurface 
to productive use, this approach favors the intruder.  Second, even the rare 
surface owner who is actively using the subsurface has the burden of proving 
that the intruder has “actually interfered” with his use.  Due to the com-
plexity of subsurface geology, it will be extraordinarily difficult for any 
owner to make this factual showing.  Chance itself demonstrates the prob-
lem: Even though plaintiffs presented expert testimony by a hydrogeologist, 
the court dismissed this evidence as “simply too speculative.”268  Ultimately, 
Chance reflects a judicial mindset that views ownership rights in the deep 
subsurface as meaningless. 
C. A Blank Slate 
The discussion above establishes two key points.  First, American law 
has never determined whether a landowner’s rights extend more than two 
miles below the surface.  Indeed, because the extent of property rights is a 
question of state law, the downward limit reflected in appellate decisions will 
vary significantly by jurisdiction—but will be less than two miles, perhaps 
much less, outside of Louisiana.  Accordingly, we confront the proverbial 
blank slate in determining the extent of property rights below two miles. 
Second, the law governing the owner’s rights within two miles of the 
surface is largely inconsistent with the center of the earth theory.  Judicial 
decisions and specialized statutes have so eroded the supposed rights of the 
surface owner that the few remaining fragments cannot legitimately be seen 
as title.269  In short, the exceptions have swallowed any theoretical rule. 
                                                                                                                            
 268. Id. at 993.  See also Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals, LP v. EPA, No. 05-74742, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2817, at *41 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2006) (denying an application for a pre-
liminary injunction against an injection of hazardous wastes 4000 feet deep on the basis that the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate injury to its planned brine extraction project, because “it is not 
possible now to know for sure the extent to which hazardous wastes . . . would affect the brines”). 
 269. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 10 cmt. c (1936) (implying that at some point the 
degree of loss of property rights might become so substantial that “ownership” no longer exists). 
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IV. TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF SUBSURFACE OWNERSHIP 
A surface owner should logically hold some rights in the subsurface.  
At the most basic level, for instance, homeowner H should be entitled to 
occupy enough of the subsurface to accommodate the foundation for 
her house, tree roots, and other normal surface facilities.  But how far 
downward should these rights extend? 
Given the modern technological advances in potential subsurface uses, 
it is appropriate to consider a new model of subsurface ownership.  Because 
humans have never penetrated below the crust, it is helpful to divide the 
analysis into two questions.  First, should private ownership be recognized 
below the crust?  Second, to what extent should private ownership be 
recognized within the crust? 
In examining these questions, the evolution of airspace rights provides 
a useful, if inexact, parallel.  Just as human activities in the subsurface 
have been confined to the crust, virtually all human activities in air-
space have been limited to the earth’s atmosphere.  Under this approach, 
the inaccessible region below the crust is akin to the relatively inaccessi-
ble reaches of outer space.  It is generally accepted that private property 
rights cannot exist in the moon and other celestial objects.270  For much 
the same reasons, it would be inappropriate to recognize property rights 
below the crust. 
The scope of property rights within the crust poses a more difficult 
issue.  The discussion below examines four alternative approaches to the ques-
tion.  Ultimately, this Article suggests that an owner’s rights should extend 
only 1000 feet below the surface, with an exception for mineral rights. 
A. Factors Affecting the Extent of Subsurface Ownership 
As a general matter, the extent of property rights is necessarily 
determined by the justification for private property.271  The dominant juris-
prudential theory justifying American property law is traditional 
utilitarianism: the familiar idea that property exists to promote the 
                                                                                                                            
 270. Article II of the Outer Space Theory prohibits any nation from claiming sovereignty in the 
moon, the planets, or other celestial objects; if national sovereignty cannot exist there, by definition, 
private property rights cannot exist.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter 1967 Treaty]. 
 271. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 1–6 (1977). 
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happiness of society as a whole.272  During the twentieth century, courts 
relied on utilitarian considerations to justify abandonment of the ad coelum 
approach to airspace rights.273  In the same manner, a utilitarian analysis of 
five criteria274 suggests that private property rights should not extend deeper 
than the very shallow crust.275 
1. Expectations 
Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, famously observed that 
property rights are premised on expectations: “Property is nothing but a basis 
of expectation.”276  In a similar fashion, modern courts and scholars have 
stressed the importance of societal expectations in defining the extent of 
property rights.277 
Empirical research conducted for this Article indicates that most 
homeowners believe their rights extend only to the immediate subsurface 
below their homes.  During June 2007, one hundred homeowners in 
Davis, California were asked: “How far below the surface does your property 
ownership extend?”278  As shown in the Appendix, 76 percent of the sur-
veyed owners believed that their property rights extended no deeper than 
one hundred feet.279  Moreover, 85 percent indicated that their rights ended 
                                                                                                                            
 272. See SPRANKLING, supra note 62, at 12, 16; see also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 
(N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values.  They are recognized to that end, and are lim-
ited by it.”). 
 273. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. 
 274. These criteria are largely adapted from those employed in the decisions that ended the 
“ownership to the heavens” prong of the ad inferos maxim.  Other criteria, of course, may also be 
relevant.  But see Steven D. McGrew, Note, Selected Issues in Federal Condemnations for Underground 
Natural Gas Storage Rights: Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation, and Trespass, 51 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 131, 176–79 (2000) (arguing that the evolution of rights in airspace is not applicable by 
analogy to subsurface disputes because subsurface rights are more valuable). 
 275. Admittedly, a number of other theories are generally relevant to American property 
jurisprudence, ranging from labor-desert theory to civic republican theory to natural law.  See 
generally SPRANKLING, supra note 62, at 11–22.  But each assumes that the object of property 
rights can be readily accessed by humans, like the surface of land or an item of tangible personal 
property.  Because the deep subsurface is relatively inaccessible to humans, these other theories have 
little or no application to the discussion in this Subpart. 
 276. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68 (Richard Hildreth trans., Oceana 
Publications, Inc. 1975) (1802). 
 277. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting 
that the “distinct investment-backed expectations” of the owner should be considered as one factor 
to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred); Craig A. Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: 
Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 347–48 (2002); Thomas C. Grey, 
The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 28 (1986). 
 278. The survey was conducted by having the homeowners fill out a card that contained the 
two multiple-choice questions set forth in the Appendix, see infra app., one on each side of the card. 
 279. See infra app. 
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within the crust.280  While this preliminary survey is far from conclusive,281 it 
certainly suggests that most property owners do not expect to hold rights in 
the deep subsurface.282 
These survey findings reflect a practical reality: The American vision 
of land ownership is almost exclusively concerned with surface rights.  The 
average surface owner has no interest in events occurring in the deep 
subsurface because they do not affect his enjoyment of the surface. 
2. Lack of Possession 
One justification for overturning the ad coelum doctrine was that 
airspace “is in the actual possession of no one, . . . being incapable of such 
possession.”283  As the Ninth Circuit observed in an early air rights decision: 
The first and foremost of these [elementary legal] principles is that the 
very essence and origin of the legal right of property is dominion over 
it.  Property must have been reclaimed from the general mass of the 
earth, and it must be capable by its nature of exclusive possession.  
Without possession, no right in it can be maintained.284 
In our common law tradition, physical possession has long been the 
touchstone of property rights,285 because only a person in possession can util-
ize land for the common good.  This theme is evident even in Blackstone’s 
absolutist definition of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which 
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
                                                                                                                            
 280. The average thickness of the continental crust is about twenty-two to twenty-five miles.  
See LUTGENS & TARBUCK, supra note 5.  Eighty-five of the one hundred surveyed owners responded 
that their rights extended downward ten miles or less.  See infra app. 
 281. Davis, California has the “highest level of education in the state with more 
than . . . 60% [of the adult population] having attained at least a four-year college degree.”  City 
of Davis Profile, Population & Housing, http://www.city.davis.ca.us/aboutdavis/cityprofile/ 
index.cfm?topic=population (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).  Accordingly, the survey respondents 
may be more likely to know about the center of the earth theory—and thus have greater subsur-
face expectations—than most landowners elsewhere. 
 282. A satirical anecdote recounted by a North Carolina court points out the lack of public 
awareness of the ad inferos concept:  
An Irish lawyer named Sullivan once argued an air rights case before the highest court of 
Great Britain.  A member of the court asked during oral argument: “Mr. Sullivan, have your 
clients not heard of the maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos?”  
Sullivan responded: “My lords, the peasants of Northern Ireland speak of little else.” 
Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 294 S.E.2d 23, 27 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
 283. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934). 
 284. Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 285. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); 
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985). 
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exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”286  Of course, 
physical possession is necessary for the “exercise” of “dominion” that 
Blackstone contemplated.  If the law recognizes property rights only in that 
which is capable of possession, then almost all airspace—and almost all 
subsurface areas—cannot be property.287 
As applied to real property, Blackstone’s sweeping definition makes 
sense only in the context of surface and near-surface rights.  Farmer F has 
an incentive to invest the time and money necessary to grow a crop on the 
land surface—thereby providing benefits to society at large—only if the legal 
system protects her possession by recognizing both (1) her right to use the 
land and (2) her right to exclude others.288  Absent this protection, F’s crop 
would be vulnerable to any passing stranger.  English common law accord-
ingly developed a robust system of private property rights in land, based on 
the importance of protecting actual possession of the land surface. 
Like airspace, almost all of the deep subsurface is unpossessed.  The 
deepest point that humans have physically occupied in the United States 
is a gold mine shaft that extends about 1.5 miles down.289  A number of 
injection wells and oil wells reach beyond this point, but it is not clear that 
these activities should be viewed as possession.  Indeed, in cases like 
Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,290 courts seem to suggest that the surface 
owner is not in possession of the deep subsurface so as to justify a trespass 
action based on the migration of waste fluids from another injection’s 
well.291  Even these shallow penetrations are exceptional.  Under the vast 
majority of the land surface of the United States, the extent of human 
penetration is extremely small, usually less than one hundred feet. 
Similarly, the deep subsurface is largely incapable of possession in the 
traditional sense.  Due to extremes of pressure and temperature, human 
access to this region is impractical, as discussed above in Part II.  The 
temperature of over 500°C at the crust-mantle boundary, for example, 
would kill a human in a few moments.  Federal standards governing the 
                                                                                                                            
 286. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *2. 
 287. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 45 (2d ed. 1961) (noting that “it is 
questionable whether the surface owner is protected with respect to claims over subterranean 
areas which he is unable to subject to his dominion”). 
 288. See generally POSNER, supra note 247, at 32–34. 
 289. See Excell, supra note 204, at 20. 
 290. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996). 
 291. Chance and its progeny appear to repudiate the idea that the surface owner has sufficient 
possession of the subsurface to maintain a trespass action, unless that owner has an actual or 
foreseeable “use” of that subsurface region; the implication is that the surface owner may acquire 
possession only by actual use.  See id. 
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maximum temperature for worker safety effectively prohibit human labor 
below about two miles, absent unusual technology.292  Of course, with spe-
cial life support equipment, perhaps like that employed in space explo-
ration, deeper human penetration of the subsurface is possible; and 
robotic equipment can presumably reach even lower levels. 
Thus, our traditional view of private property rights in land implic-
itly assumes the “land” in question is the land surface and portions of the 
immediately adjacent airspace or subsurface necessary to facilitate sur-
face use.  Both the airspace and the subsurface surrounding this surface 
zone are typically unpossessed and largely incapable of possession. 
As a general rule, our property law system prefers private ownership 
over public ownership.  Richard Posner has explained that efficiency is 
enhanced if “every valuable (meaning scarce as well as desired) resource 
were owned by someone,” which he calls the “criterion of universality.”293  
However, almost all of the deep subsurface is not “valuable” in this sense.  
Comprising over 99 percent of the earth’s volume, it is not “scarce.”  
Similarly, because it cannot be productively possessed, it is generally not 
“desired.”  Under these circumstances, some form of public ownership of 
the deep subsurface is appropriate. 
3. Enforcement Difficulty 
Legal positivism teaches that property rights exist only to the extent that 
they can be enforced by government.294  Accordingly, courts dealing with early 
cases of alleged airplane trespass expressed concern that it would be impossible 
to enforce private property rights in airspace.  As one court summarized: 
It would be, and is, utterly impracticable and would lead to endless 
confusion, if the law should uphold attempts of landowners to stake 
                                                                                                                            
 292. The Occupational Health and Safety Act mandates that an employer must provide each 
employee with “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are capable of causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”  29 
U.S.C. § 654(a) (2000).  A workplace with excessive heat may violate this standard.  See, e.g., 
Sec’y of Labor v. Duriron Co., Inc., 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1405 (O.S.H.R.C. 1983) (finding that 
temperature in foundry up to 115°F violated standard), aff’d 750 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1984).  The 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health recommends that no worker be exposed to 
workplace heat levels in excess of 40°C.  See NIOSH CRITERIA, supra note 91, at 2, 3, 14, 15.  By 
analogy, the temperature in the deepest South African gold mines—about two miles deep—can 
reach 65°C; mining there is only possible with a combination of short shifts and extraordinarily 
powerful ventilation equipment.  See Stephanie Pain, The Intraterrestrials, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 7, 
1998, at 28.  Within the United States, the temperature at a level two miles deep ranges from 50° 
to 150°C.  See MIT STUDY, supra note 90, at 2–15. 
 293. POSNER, supra note 247, at 33. 
 294. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954). 
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out, or assert claims to definite, unused spaces in the air in order 
to protect some contemplated future use of it. . . . If such a rule were 
conceivable, how will courts protect the various landowners in their 
varying claims of portions of the sky?  How enforce a right of ejectment 
or restitution?295 
The recognition of property rights in the deep subsurface presents similar 
enforcement challenges, as Chance and similar fluid migration decisions dem-
onstrate.296  It is impractical to allow surface owners to declare portions of 
the subsurface off limits to migrating substances in order to preserve the 
option for some future, unspecified use.  Due to the geophysical complex-
ity of the subsurface even a few miles deep, it is difficult to prove the 
existence or absence of subsurface intrusions by migrating fluids.  Of course, 
this difficulty becomes more pronounced with depth. 
In fact, even if enforcement were otherwise possible, the boundaries 
of supposed subsurface parcels are impossible to locate—creating an 
enforcement nightmare.  As Part II demonstrates, the earth’s interior is 
subject to at least five different forms of motion.  The crust and upper 
mantle float on a layer of largely molten rock, moving sideways in relation 
to the mantle below like ice blocks on a lake.  The components of the mid-
dle and lower mantle themselves move horizontally and vertically; the 
molten outer core flows in a different direction; and the inner core rotates 
more quickly than the upper layers.  Thus, the theory that the surface owner 
holds title to a definable, rock-like pillar of earth from the surface to the 
core is scientifically impossible.  Rather, each component is in motion.297 
                                                                                                                            
 295. Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 296. See supra notes 260–268 and accompanying text. 
 297. Law and economics theory offers useful insights here.  Richard Posner has suggested that a 
key feature of a private property system is that “[ownership] rights must be [freely] transferable.”  
POSNER, supra note 247, at 33.  But transferability is illusory unless the scope of the rights being 
transferred can be defined in a meaningful fashion.  As discussed in the text above, the boundaries 
of deep subsurface parcels are impossible to locate due to various forms of motion within the earth.  
Thus, Paul Rubin’s qualification to Posner’s view is directly relevant: “Everything must be owned for 
efficiency (at least up to the point where enforcement of title is more expensive than the value of 
ownership).”  Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 208 (1982).  
Given the inherent problems in enforcing subsurface property rights—including ever-shifting 
boundaries—enforcement costs may well exceed the fair market value of a subsurface parcel.  For 
example, it seems likely that the fair market value of a subsurface parcel located more than 1000 feet 
below the land surface is probably zero, absent special mineral value. 
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4. Environmental Concerns 
In a broad sense, the deep subsurface may be viewed as a type of 
wilderness: a pristine, natural region largely unaffected by human con-
duct.298  The interior of the earth is a new frontier, almost entirely 
unexplored; humans have physically traveled less than two miles below 
the earth’s surface.  Thus, almost all of the interior remains in primeval 
condition, untouched by the human hand.  If we view the earth’s interior 
as a special type of wilderness, then arguably it should be safeguarded for 
future generations by restricting subsurface ownership. 
An extensive body of federal, state, and local laws facilitates the 
preservation of environmentally sensitive lands.299  Consistent with utilitar-
ian theory, the law protects these lands primarily because of the benefits 
they may potentially provide to humans.300  For instance, a species thought 
to be worthless to humans today may someday have value as technology 
progresses.  This principle is demonstrated by the Pacific Yew tree—long 
denigrated by loggers as worthless for lumber—whose bark was found to 
contain a substance now used to treat certain forms of cancer.301  A second, 
more muted theme underlying wilderness protection is moral duty: the 
concept that other species should enjoy a right to exist.302  Survey data show 
that most Americans agree that moral duty requires the preservation of 
nonhuman species.303 
                                                                                                                            
 298. This standard reflects the working definition of “wilderness” embodied in decisions 
concerning tracts of wild and undeveloped land that are not subject to the federal Wilderness 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2000).  See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American 
Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 562 (1996).  Although applicable only to certain feder-
ally owned lands, the definition in the Wilderness Act is also helpful by analogy: “an area of 
undeveloped . . . land retaining its primeval character and influence . . . which . . . generally appears 
to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substan-
tially unnoticeable.”  16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
 299. See generally FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2006); LINDA A. 
MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE (2006). 
 300. For example, the U.S. Congress adopted the Wilderness Act “to secure for the American 
people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.”  16 
U.S.C. § 1131(a).  In this context, wilderness is seen as a “resource” for human use.  See generally 
Sprankling, supra note 298, at 521–33 (discussing early American attitudes toward wilderness). 
 301. See Sharon Begley & Patricia King, The Lowly Yew Yields Riches, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 
1991, at 67. 
 302. The foremost exponent of this view was Aldo Leopold, who advocated a “land ethic” 
that would respect the rights of all species to exist in harmony with the environment.  See ALDO 
LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 201–26 (Oxford 1949); see also James P. Karp, 
Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic: Is an Ecological Conscience Evolving in Land Development Law?, 
19 ENVTL. L. 737 (1989). 
 303. See THE ROPER ORG., NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION: WHERE ENVIRONMENTALISM 
IS HEADED IN THE 1990S, at 62 (1992). 
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Similarly, international law increasingly recognizes the importance of 
protecting wilderness lands.  For example, the landmark Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations on the Human Environment304 pro-
vided that “[t]he natural resources of the earth including the air, water, 
land, flora, and fauna . . . must be safeguarded for the benefit of present 
and future generations through careful planning or management.”305  In 
this spirit, a number of international conventions provide that certain 
regions—such as the moon and the deep sea floor—are part of the “com-
mon heritage” of all humans and, accordingly, are not subject to private 
property rights.306 
Scientific research demonstrates that life forms do exist in the deep 
crust.  For example, bacteria have been discovered almost two miles deep in 
Virginia307 and over three miles deep in Sweden.308  Concluding that “[t]here 
are strong indications that microbial life is widespread at depth in the 
crust of the Earth,” one scientist suggested that life may be found at levels 
more than six miles deep.309  Because humans have never penetrated below 
the crust, it is impossible to know whether life exists there, although the 
extreme heat makes this unlikely.310  While the potential value of subsur-
face life to humans is unknown, one major pharmaceutical company has 
committed to examine 3200 types of subsurface bacteria in the hope of 
developing new products.311 
Federal law already regulates private access to the subsurface, in part 
to protect environmental values.  The statutes restricting injection wells and 
surface coal mining, for example, reflect the need to limit private property 
                                                                                                                            
 304. June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416. 
 305. Id. at 1418. 
 306. See, e.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies art. 11(3), Jul. 11, 1984, 1363 U.N.T.S. 22, 25; United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, arts. 1, 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 399, 446.  It should be noted, however, 
that the United States is not a party to either of these conventions.  But the United States has 
ratified the Outer Space Treaty; Article II of that treaty provides that outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, 
which effectively bars the establishment of private property rights in outer space.  1967 Treaty, 
supra note 270. 
 307. David R. Boone et al., Bacillus Infernus Sp. Nov., an Fe(III)- and Mn(IV)-Reducing 
Anaerobe From the Deep Terrestrial Surface, 45 INT’L J. SYSTEMATIC BACTERIOLOGY 441 (1995) 
(discussing bacteria located in core samples taken 1.7 miles below surface). 
 308. See Ulrich Szewzyg et al., Thermaphilic, Anaerobic Bacteria Isolated From a Deep Borehole 
in Granite in Sweden, 91 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1810 (1994) (discussing bacteria discovered in 
water that entered a borehole at about three miles underground). 
 309. Thomas Gold, The Deep, Hot Biosphere, 89 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6045, 6045 (1992). 
 310. See id. at 6048. 
 311. James K. Fredrickson & Tullis C. Onstott, Microbes Deep Inside the Earth, SCI. AM., 
Oct. 1996, at 68, 73. 
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rights in order to avoid environmental damage.312  In the same manner, envi-
ronmental concerns should be considered as a factor in determining the 
general extent of subsurface property rights.313 
5. New Technologies 
Utilitarian theory teaches that overall societal welfare may require 
limitations on property rights.  As one judge summarized: “Private prop-
erty . . . is essential to our way of life . . . . But reducing too much to private 
property can be bad medicine.”314  Too much private property, in short, may 
be as injurious as too little.  As applied to real property, one problem in this 
regard is excessive fragmentation.  Thus, Michael Heller observed that 
“[w]hen public policy encourages the formation of lots that are too small 
to use productively, owners may have a difficult time aggregating them to a 
more viable scale.”315  He suggested that property law responds to this 
dilemma through “diverse doctrines that prevent and abolish excessive 
fragmentation and keep resources well-scaled for productive use.”316  Heller’s 
insight applies directly to the millions of long, narrow subsurface par-
cels—somewhat like pieces of string—that logically arise from the center 
of the earth theory.  This fragmentation has the potential to interfere with 
new technologies such as carbon sequestration, heat mining, and other 
valuable uses that would occupy large subsurface regions. 
As noted above,317 the landmark decision signaling the demise of the 
ad coelum doctrine is United States v. Causby,318 in which the Supreme 
Court reasoned that the concept “had no place in the modern world” 
because it would subject any airline to repeated trespass suits.319  The Court 
explained that “[t]o recognize such private claims to the airspace would 
clog these highways, [and] seriously interfere with their control and devel-
opment in the public interest.”320  In Causby, the Court confronted the 
fragmentation problem in the context of airspace—recognizing the surface 
                                                                                                                            
 312. See supra notes 210–213 and 225–234 and accompanying text. 
 313. Of course, the normal functioning of the earth’s interior is essential to the existence of all 
life.  A disruption of the magnetic field created by the outer core, for example, would subject the 
earth’s surface to dangerous gamma rays and X-rays.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 314. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
 315. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1172 (1999). 
 316. Id. at 1165. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 146–147. 
 318. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 319. Id. at 260. 
 320. Id. at 261. 
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owners’ title to the columns of airspace above millions of parcels would give 
them virtual veto power over airplane travel, thus clogging the highways of 
the sky.  The subsurface rights arising from the center of the earth theory may 
produce much the same problem. 
President George W. Bush has emphasized that ‘“technology offers great 
promise to significantly reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions—especially carbon 
capture, storage, and sequestration technologies.’”321  Carbon sequestration is 
a technique for mitigating the impact of global climate change by removing 
carbon dioxide from the air and then storing it in deep subsurface layers, such 
as depleted oil and gas reservoirs, saline formations, coal seams, shales, and 
basalts.322  In field tests, carbon dioxide has been successfully injected into 
wells ranging in depth from 1000 feet to over two miles.323  Although the first 
large-scale demonstration project will not begin until 2011,324 it is already 
clear that each facility will require a large subsurface parcel.  For example, the 
U.S. Department of Energy estimated that the area of contamination “from 
an injection of one million tons of CO2 per year in a deep saline formation for 
20 years could be spread over a horizontal area of 15 square miles or more.”325  
Another study, by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, sug-
gested that injected carbon dioxide might disperse into an area of about 
thirty-eight square miles over thirty years.326 
Heat mining, or “enhanced geothermal systems,” is a novel method of 
producing energy from noncarbon sources, which could be beneficial in reduc-
ing our dependence on fossil fuels.327  A recent study by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) estimated that over time, this technology 
could produce over one hundred billion watts of electrical power,328 enough 
                                                                                                                            
 321. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Fossil Energy: DOE’s Carbon Sequestration Research Program, 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (alteration 
in original) (quoting President George W. Bush); see also Stephanie M. Haggerty, Note, Legal 
Requirements for Widespread Implementation of CO2 Sequestration in Depleted Oil Reservoirs, 21 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 197 (2003) (discussing carbon sequestration generally). 
 322. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP AND 
PROGRAM PLAN 20 (2007). 
 323. Id. at 39. 
 324. Id. at 11. 
 325. Id. at 27. 
 326. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP III, 
SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE AND CAPTURE 256 (2005) (predicting dispersal of 
carbon dioxide over one hundred square kilometers). 
 327. See MIT STUDY, supra note 90. 
 328. Id. at 1–3 (“[Enhanced Geothermal Systems] could provide 100 [Gigawatt-electric] or more 
of cost-competitive generating capacity in the next 50 years.”). 
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to meet 10 percent of America’s needs by 2050.329  Heat mining involves the 
creation of an artificial geothermal energy plant: Water is injected down a 
well between one and six miles deep,330 reaching rock with a natural heat 
level of 150° to 250°C; this heat creates steam, which is captured by another 
well and then transported to the surface to turn turbines that generate elec-
tricity.331  A heat mining facility would include a number of wells, cover-
ing a subsurface area of over four square miles or more.332  The MIT study 
concluded that “it may be possible to site [such facilities] within populated 
and industrial districts, a clear advantage over fossil or nuclear plants.”333 
Just as the new technology of the airplane ended the ad coelum era, 
new technologies for large-scale use of the deep subsurface—such as carbon 
sequestration and heat mining—may herald the end of the center of the 
earth approach.  Under this theory, the subsurface is broken up into col-
umns of rock and soil owned by the surface owners.  This logically creates a 
multitude of extremely thin columns.  Consider, for example, a residential 
subdivision consisting of 500 homes, each one located on a lot 75 feet wide 
and 150 feet long.  In order to use the entire subsurface, an enterprise would 
need to acquire title to 500 different columns.  If any single owner refused 
to sell his subsurface rights—or demanded an exorbitant price—the entire 
project would be endangered.334  Such a patchwork of extremely small, 
individually owned subsurface parcels would make it difficult to develop 
large-scale subsurface projects that serve the public interest.335  The problem 
                                                                                                                            
 329. Mark Clayton, Mining Heat From the Earth?  New Technology Shows Promise, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2007, at 1. 
 330. Id. 
 331. MIT STUDY, supra note 90. 
 332. Id. at 8–7 (noting that “well fields can cover a considerable area, typically 5 to 10 km² 
or more”). 
 333. Id. at 8–16. 
 334. The holdout problem is well recognized by the scholarly literature in the context of sur-
face rights.  See, e.g., Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private 
Economic Redevelopment, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 26 (2007) (“[A] major obstacle to economic revitaliza-
tion of urban cores is ‘over-subdivision,’ where old land use patterns leave an artifact of multiple 
small lots under different ownerships.”).  If a private developer tried to purchase multiple small par-
cels in order to create a large project, inevitably some owners would demand higher prices—well 
above fair market value—thus making the project financially unfeasible.  Id; see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74–75 (1986) (discussing the impact 
of holdouts). 
 335. Historically, a city or county confronted with one or more holdouts who refused to sell 
their properties for a socially valuable, but privately owned, project could acquire the land through 
eminent domain and resell the properties to the private developer.  But after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the scope of a local govern-
ment’s eminent domain power in such a situation is unclear.  See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo 
Is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 803 (2006).  Although 
Justice Kennedy voted to uphold the city’s power to take in that case—thus becoming the fifth vote 
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would be less pronounced, of course, in rural areas with larger parcel sizes.  
Even here, however, it may be difficult to acquire the subsurface rights to 
thirty-eight square miles of land, the parcel size potentially needed for a 
use such as carbon sequestration. 
B. Abolishing Ownership Below the Crust 
American law has never determined whether a surface owner holds 
property rights in the zone from the mantle to the center of the earth, as 
demonstrated in Part III.  Humans have never penetrated below the crust; 
no case holding or statute resolves the question; and the center of the earth 
theory of subsurface rights is mere hyperbole.  As one modern English jurist 
characterized the existing case law: “In none of these cases is there an 
authoritative pronouncement that ‘land’ means the whole of the space from 
the centre of the earth to the heavens: so sweeping, unscientific and 
unpractical a doctrine is unlikely to appeal to the common law mind.”336  
Thus, in determining whether ownership should extend below the crust, 
judges and legislators will confront an open issue. 
The policy analysis above337 indicates that property rights should not 
extend below the crust.  Most surface owners do not expect that their title 
reaches past the crust.  Modern scientific research, unknown in Blackstone’s 
era, teaches that human access to this region is virtually impossible.  The 
area is both unpossessed and incapable of possession, much like the surface 
of a distant planet: hotter than Venus, and just as deadly to humans.  Thus, 
any attempt to enforce property rights in this area would be illusory.  
Environmental protection of the deep subsurface is best realized by barring 
private ownership at this time.  Finally, if and when human use of the region 
becomes technologically possible, presumably large areas of access will be 
required for productive use, unfettered by a multitude of thin columns. 
Assuming that the mantle, outer core, and inner core are not owned by 
surface owners, then who owns these regions?  The best approach may be to 
view this area as public land owned by the federal government, much like a 
                                                                                                                            
needed for a majority—his concurrence stressed the fact that the identity of those who would benefit 
from the taking, the future developers, was unknown.  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)  This implies that he might not find the requisite “public use” if the project involved 
transferring land to a single new private owner whose identity is known in advance, which would 
probably be the case with a heat mining or carbon sequestration project. 
 336. Comm’r for Rys. v. Valuer-General, [1974] A.C. 328, 351–52 (Wilberforce, J.). 
 337. See supra Part IV.A. 
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national forest or a wildlife preserve.338  Almost by definition, any unowned 
land within a nation’s territory is subject to governmental control.  Moreover, 
this result is supported by empirical data from the June 2007 homeowner 
survey, as shown in the Appendix.339  When asked the question—“Who 
owns the land underneath your property?”—59 percent of the respondents 
said that it belonged to a governmental entity, while 20 percent thought 
that it belonged to “no one.”340  Thus, vesting title in a governmental entity 
is broadly consistent with public expectations. 
Federal and state governments already play a significant role in licensing 
access to the subsurface areas, as discussed in Part III.  For instance, in some 
states, the surface owner may not remove groundwater without a permit; and 
the unitization of oil and gas production in certain jurisdictions inherently 
restricts private drilling.  At the national level, a surface owner may not 
remove coal merely ten feet below ground level without a federal permit; 
similarly, a surface owner cannot install an injection well even 500 feet deep 
without a permit from the federal government or a federally approved state 
regulatory agency.  Expanding the scope of this authority so as to require a 
federal permit for any type of access below the crust—usually more than 
twenty miles beneath the surface—would fit comfortably into this existing 
regulatory framework.341 
C. Models for Ownership Within the Crust 
The surface owner should certainly hold property rights to a portion of 
the subsurface.  At a minimum, efficient use of the land surface often requires 
                                                                                                                            
 338. Alternatively, these regions could be designated as areas where no nation holds sover-
eignty, and thus subject to international regulation.  Perhaps they could be classified as part of the 
“common heritage” of all humans, much like the moon and the high seas.  See generally KEMAL 
BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1998). 
 339. See infra app. 
 340. See infra app. 
 341. But would such action constitute a taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment 
for which just compensation is required?  Probably not.  The closest case is Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), in which the Court held that any permanent physical 
occupation by the government was a compensatory taking.  Id. at 426.  But, in this context, it is appar-
ent that the Court was concerned with governmental action that would adversely affect rights on the 
land surface.  Underpinning the decision was the Court’s recognition that “property law has long 
protected an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of 
his property.”  Id. at 436.  As shown in the Appendix, survey data indicate that a majority of owners 
have no expectation that their property rights extend to the deep subsurface, see infra app.—so 
the Loretto rationale is inapplicable.  Cf. FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation 
Comm’n, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *5–6 (Tex. App. Feb. 6, 2003) (rejecting a 
claim that the deprivation of subsurface rights constituted a taking under Loretto). 
1034 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 979 (2008) 
 
 
that an ordinary owner have legal access to the zone immediately below the 
surface, for foundations, roots, wells, and the like.  For almost 500 years, our 
common law system has accepted the owner’s title to this near-surface zone. 
But how deeply into the crust should the surface owner’s rights 
extend?  The analysis below explores four alternative models of subsurface 
ownership: (1) ownership within the entire crust; (2) ownership based on 
first-in-time exploitative use; (3) ownership for reasonable and foreseeable 
uses; and (4) ownership to a specified depth, such as 1000 feet.  Title to the 
subsurface below this point should be vested in the federal government. 
1. Ownership of the Entire Crust 
One approach is to extend the surface owner’s rights downward to the 
crust-mantle boundary, an average of twenty-two to twenty-five miles deep.342  
The central virtue of this model is maximum deference to the potential 
expectations of surface owners.  Because humans have never penetrated into 
the mantle, it seems unlikely that landowners would truly expect to hold title 
to this region—which the homeowner survey data confirm.  Certainly, 
entities with existing operations in the deep crust, notably companies 
operating oil, gas, or injection wells may hold expectations that their property 
rights extend even more deeply; but it is possible to accommodate these 
specialized concerns in a narrower manner, as discussed below.343 
A second virtue of this model, when compared with the next two alter-
natives, is a more clearly defined lower boundary for property rights: the 
point where the crust reaches the mantle.  Although the depth of the con-
tinental crust varies somewhat, it is scientifically possible to determine this 
line, in an approximate sense, by measuring density.344  This certainty, in 
turn, promotes transferability and hence efficiency. 
This model otherwise suffers from the same problems that infect the 
center of the earth approach.  The deep crust is unpossessed and incapable 
of possession; the enforcement of subsurface property rights at that depth is 
impractical; environmental concerns are ignored; and new technologies are 
potentially stifled.  Ultimately, the average surface owner has no legitimate 
interest in controlling the deep crust. 
                                                                                                                            
 342. A variant on this approach would be to extend the surface owner’s rights to the entire 
lithosphere, including the entire crust and the upper mantle.  Under this approach, title would 
extend down through the entire North American tectonic plate to the layer of molten rock upon 
which it floats.  See generally supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 343. See infra note 356 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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2. Ownership Based on First-in-Time Exploitative Use 
Our de facto system for allocating deep subsurface property rights essen-
tially vests title in the first person to use the subsurface for a productive 
purpose, regardless of where his surface rights are located.345  Thus, to a large 
extent, property rights in subsurface resources such as water, oil, gas, and 
waste disposal capacity have been assigned through a rule of capture: The 
first captor owns the resource, whether or not it is located under his land 
surface.  Of course, this basic approach is increasingly modified by gov-
ernmental regulation.  However, shorn of regulatory limits, it offers another 
possible model for subsurface ownership.  The logic of this model suggests 
that the surface owner holds no subsurface rights until and unless she 
undertakes some economically viable subsurface use.  Before that point, 
she holds merely a potential, inchoate interest in the subsurface, just as one 
holding a hunting license does not yet own any wild game. 
This model arguably satisfies concerns based on expectations.  Presuma-
bly, specialized entities that are already involved in productive uses of the 
deep subsurface expect that the current approach will continue.  Moreover, 
this approach is consistent with the homeowner survey in that it deprives 
the ordinary owner of property rights below the immediate land surface, 
which is what the respondents actually expect.  But the sophisticated owner 
with an expectation of using his subsurface for a future project may lose the 
race to his neighbor who acts first and thereby captures the resource.346 
However, this approach fails to satisfy the other concerns discussed 
above.  First, while oil, gas, and injection wells do penetrate into the deep 
subsurface, it would be elevating form over substance to suggest that these 
isolated intrusions should be viewed as “possession” of the subsurface.  
Another problem is that under this approach the extent of property rights 
would be poorly defined.  Due to the complexity of subsurface geology, 
it would be impossible to delineate the horizontal and vertical contours 
of each subsurface “parcel” that has been “captured” (such as by inject-
ing liquid wastes).347  This presents the enforceability problems described 
above; it also impairs the marketability of these parcels and other adjacent 
                                                                                                                            
 345. This is part of an approach to property rights that I have elsewhere called “exploitative 
utilitarianism.”  John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. 
REV. 816, 856 (1994). 
 346. See, e.g., Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals LP v. EPA, No. 05-7472, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2817 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2006) (denying an injunction to bar the expansion of the defen-
dant’s injection of subsurface wastes, even though plaintiff planned a competing project). 
 347. In addition, the downward extent of ownership would vary from parcel to parcel—depend-
ing on the extent of exploitative use—producing both confusion and inefficiency. 
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subsurface lands by making them more difficult to transfer.348  Next, it is gen-
erally accepted that a capture rule facilitates the destruction of natural 
resources, because it provides no incentive to preserve those resources for 
future use; they must be either used immediately or lost forever.349  Thus, 
viewing the natural subsurface as a resource, this approach would encourage 
wasteful practices that might well cause irreparable damage.  Finally, by 
vesting property rights in the first-in-time user, this model makes it more 
difficult to develop new, more technologically advanced subsurface uses. 
3. Ownership Based on Reasonable and Foreseeable Use 
A handful of thoughtful American decisions support extending the 
surface owner’s rights downward to the underlying subsurface as necessary to 
protect existing uses that are both reasonable and foreseeable.  For example, 
the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned in Chance v. BP Petroleum, Inc.350 that 
the surface owner could exclude invasions by others that “actually interfere 
with [the owner’s] reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface.”351 
This view is a variant on the first-in-time model discussed above: Unless 
the surface owner is already engaged in a reasonable and foreseeable use, a 
first-in-time stranger may capture the subsurface.  Thus, it suffers from the 
same defects inherent in the first-in-time model, except in two areas.  First, 
the reasonable and foreseeable use model arguably protects the legitimate 
expectations of the sophisticated surface owner, because it extends to only 
foreseeable uses, that is, those that a person would expect to be able to engage 
in.  Thus, for example, this approach would respect existing investments in 
oil, gas, and waste injection wells.  Second, this model may provide some 
protection for environmental values, because it gives the surface owner an 
incentive to engage in only reasonable uses, a standard that may impliedly 
consider the extent of environmental degradation. 
4. Ownership to a Specified Depth 
A final model is to restrict the surface owner’s rights to the subsurface to 
a specific depth zone, such as 500 feet, 1000 feet, or one mile deep.  This 
                                                                                                                            
 348. See generally supra note 297. 
 349. See, e.g., Dale D. Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, 
and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 814–17 (2005) (analyzing the effect of the capture rule on 
natural resources). 
 350. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996). 
 351. Id. at 992. 
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approach is premised on the idea that subsurface rights should exist only to 
the extent reasonably necessary to facilitate the owner’s use of the surface.  
Just as the airspace cases suggest that the surface owner holds title only to 
the zone immediately above her land surface (usually up to 500 feet),352 this 
model recognizes her title only to the zone immediately beneath the surface. 
One of the few decisions implementing this approach is Boehringer 
v. Montalto,353 in which a New York court rejected the claim that a pub-
lic sewer line 150 feet deep violated a deed covenant against encumbrances.354  
After discussing the demise of the ad coelum approach to airspace, the 
court concluded: 
It, therefore, appears that the old theory that the title of an owner 
of real property extends indefinitely upward and downward is no longer 
an accepted principle of law in its entirety.  Title above the surface of 
the ground is now limited to the extent to which the owner of the soil 
may reasonably make use thereof. 
By analogy, the title of an owner to the soil will not be extended 
to a depth below ground beyond which the owner may not reasonably 
make use thereof. 
It is concluded that the depth at which the . . . sewer exists is 
beyond the point to which the owner can conceivably make use of 
the property . . . .355 
Boehringer thus suggests that the zone of subsurface ownership should be less 
than 150 feet deep, at least as applied to residential property.  While rea-
sonable minds could certainly differ on the point, a deeper zone—perhaps 
1000 feet downward—seems more appropriate as a general rule, by analogy 
to the airspace decisions. 
However, many oil, gas, and hard rock mineral operations now func-
tion at levels far below 1000 feet.  The simplistic zone model fails to protect 
vested rights in specific minerals and to encourage development of new 
                                                                                                                            
 352. Federal law generally defines navigable airspace as the zone more than 500 feet above 
the land surface, with exceptions for flights over sparsely populated areas or over water.  14 C.F.R. 
§ 119 (2007). 
 353. 254 N.Y.S. 276 (Spec. Term 1931); cf. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 826 
(Ga. 1934) (suggesting, in the context of airspace rights, that “[p]erhaps the owner of the land may 
be considered as being in actual possession of the space immediately covering the trees, buildings, 
and structures affixed to the soil, so that the act of navigating a plane through this stratum could be 
condemned as a trespass”). 
 354. Boehringer, 254 N.Y.S. 276; see also First Unitarian Soc’y v. Citizens Sav. & Trust Co., 
142 N.W. 87 (Iowa 1913) (holding that a public sewer line six feet below the land surface did not 
breach the covenant against encumbrances); cf. In re Application of Gillespie, 17 N.Y.S.2d 560 
(Gen. Term 1940) (awarding only nominal damages for the construction of a tunnel 500 feet 
below the land surface because it did not interfere with surface use or diminish property value). 
 355. Boehringer, 254 N.Y.S. at 278. 
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mineral resources.  One partial solution is to modify this model by honoring 
all existing rights to extract specific valuable minerals, at least to the extent 
appropriate to ensure a reasonable return on prior investments.356 
With this modification, the zone model comes closest to meeting the 
subsurface ownership criteria discussed above.  First, it is consistent with 
the homeowner survey data, which indicate that the majority of owners 
expect only very shallow ownership: 76 percent believe their rights extend 
downward 100 feet or less.  Second, the subsurface within the 1000 foot 
zone is readily susceptible of possession: It is relatively immoveable; tem-
perature, pressure, and other conditions there readily support human life; 
and virtually all past human activity in the subsurface is within this 
region.  Third, in general, this zone is sufficiently close to the surface 
both to delineate parcel boundaries and to enforce property rights, at least 
in comparison to much deeper regions.  Fourth, by minimizing private 
subsurface ownership, this approach is the most protective of environ-
mental values.  Finally, this model best facilitates the development of new 
subsurface technologies by avoiding the inefficiency inherent in trying to 
assemble many small parcels.  The federal government can regulate access 
to large subsurface areas below 1000 feet for uses such as carbon sequestra-
tion, heat mining, and other future technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that “[i]t is revolting to have 
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time 
of Henry IV.”357  He accordingly bemoaned the continued existence of any 
“rule [that] simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”358 
Holmes’s comment neatly captures the absurdity of the center of the 
earth approach to subsurface ownership.  Blackstone’s theory was not forged 
in the furnace of logic, but rather proclaimed as natural law that was immune 
                                                                                                                            
 356. Crafting such a modification will require care.  Because “mineral” is broadly defined in 
many states, potentially including almost everything under the surface, an exclusion for “all” mineral 
rights would vitiate the zone model.  Compare Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 899 
(Ky. 1952) (defining “minerals” to include “all organic and inorganic substances that can be taken 
from the earth”), with W.S. Newell, Inc. v. Randall, 373 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Ala. 1979) (noting 
that “mineral” connotes “a substance rare and exceptional in character possessing special value”).  
See generally George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word “Minerals,” 54 N.D. L. REV. 419, 423 
(1978) (observing that the term “has no definite and certain meaning”).  At the same time, existing 
investments in oil, gas, and hard rock mining operations should be respected. 
 357. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 358. Id. 
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from rational debate.  Center of the earth rhetoric lingers today in case law 
and legal scholarship largely due to uncritical acceptance of Blackstone’s 
endorsement.  As Holmes would have said, it is blind imitation of the past. 
The idea that the surface owner held title up to the heavens could be 
dismissed as harmless hyperbole until it threatened the development of 
the airplane.  Given our modern scientific knowledge and new advances 
in subsurface technology, we must now confront the equally foolish notion 
that the surface owner holds title to the center of the earth—including a 
slice of the planet’s molten core.  Lacking support in either law or logic, the 
center of the earth approach is merely a curious relic from a bygone age. 
Demolition is easier than construction.  If we accept the premise that 
the center of the earth orthodoxy must be abandoned, then the difficult 
question is what should replace it.  The analysis above strongly suggests 
that private property rights should not extend below the earth’s crust.  While 
many models for delimiting rights within the crust might be considered, 
one promising model would recognize the surface owner’s title to the 
subsurface only for a specific depth, such as 1000 feet.  Of course, reason-
able minds can fairly differ as to the appropriate extent of property rights 
within the crust.  The goal of this Article is to ignite that debate, not to 
extinguish it. 




APPENDIX: RESULTS OF JUNE 2007 HOMEOWNER SURVEY359 
1. How far below the surface does your property ownership extend? 
If you’re not sure, please give us your best estimate. 
10 feet: 49% 
100 feet: 27% 
1000 feet: 5% 
1 mile: 3% 
10 miles: 1% 
100 miles: 0 
1000 miles: 1% 
To the center of the earth: 14% 
 
2. Who owns the area underneath your property?   
If you’re not sure, please give us your best estimate. 
The federal government: 10% 
The state: 16% 
The county: 16% 
The city: 17% 
A private person or company: 21% 
No one: 20% 
                                                                                                                            
 359. This survey was conducted by having one hundred homeowners in Davis, California fill 
out survey cards in June 2007.  Each card contained the two multiple-choice questions set forth 
above, one on each side of the card.  Each respondent was asked to answer Question 1 before see-
ing Question 2, in order to minimize any bias that might result from the text of Question 2.  It would 
be inappropriate to put too much reliance on the survey results, though, because the sample size 
was small and the methodology informal.  A more rigorous empirical study of owners’ expectations 
would be helpful. 
